Sixth Amendment Right to an Attorney and to Confrontation

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Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel:

The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. (sic)”

General Rules:

“If the accused . . . is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.” (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 468 [82 L.Ed. 1461, 1468].)

“The essence of this right . . . is the opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney and to have him investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial.” (Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 348 [108 L.Ed.2nd 293, 301].)

The constitutional right to counsel is designed to assist the accused in coping with “the intricacies of substantive and procedural law. . . . The right to counsel exists to protect the accused during the trial-type confrontations with the prosecutor.” (United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 189-190 [81 L.Ed.2nd 146, 155].)

One’s right to select his own counsel is limited to retained, but not appointed, counsel. (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1122.)

When a defendant does not require appointed counsel, and he is able to retain his own attorney, he is constitutionally entitled to have the attorney of his own choice. (United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140 [165 L.Ed.2nd 409].)

See also P.C. § 987, which provides that if a defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, the court shall inform the defendant of
his or her right to counsel and shall ask the defendant whether he or she desires the assistance of counsel.

The court is required to appoint the public defender if available. If not, an attorney on contract with the county must be appointed if available. Only then may private counsel not on contract with the county be appointed. In the interest of justice, a court may depart from that portion of the procedure requiring appointment of a county-contracted attorney after making a finding of good cause and stating the reasons therefore on the record. (P.C. § 987.2)

The finding of good cause is a matter of the trial court’s discretion, taking into account such factors as whether the request was timely, agreement of appointed counsel, defendant’s preference, and a prior relationship with the attorney requested establishing trust and confidence. (Gressett v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 114, 118-123; citing Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 786, 799.)

And see P.C. § 859, providing similar requirements upon the filing of a complaint.

Massiah Error (Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [12 L.Ed.2nd 246]): Questioning a suspect after an arraignment where the suspect has requested the appointment of an attorney, when the questioning (or “deliberately eliciting” incriminating statements) is attempted without the presence (or consent) of the subject’s attorney, is a Sixth Amendment violation. (See also Michigan v. Jackson (1986) 475 U.S. 625 [89 L.Ed.2nd 631]; and Minnick v. Mississippi (1990) 498 U.S. 146 [112 L.Ed.2nd 489].)

Massiah involved an undercover officer soliciting incriminating information from an out-of-custody defendant after the defendant’s arraignment. The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that had the officer first advised defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and obtained a waiver of that right (a procedure obviously not conducive to an undercover situation), there would have been no error in talking to the defendant without the presence of his attorney. (See Montjej v. Louisiana (May 26, 2009) 556 U.S. 778 [173 L.Ed.2nd 955].)

Note: The Supreme Court has indicated that there is a difference between an “interrogation,” as applies to a Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination situation, and “deliberately eliciting” incriminating statements, as applies to a Sixth Amendment, right-to-an-attorney-situation, giving the later a much broader application. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300, fn. 4
“Offense-Specific:” One’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense-specific;” i.e., it applies only to the offense for which he or she is then charged. (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171 [115 L.Ed.2nd 158]; see also Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 279-280, fn. 16 [88 L.Ed.2nd 481, 498-499]; People v. Plyler (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535, 545-548; Texas v. Cobb (2001) 532 U.S. 162 [149 L.Ed.2nd 321].)

Rule: Questioning on any other case not yet charged, is not precluded by the Sixth Amendment. (United States v. Baez-Acuna (10th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3rd 634; People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1209-1210; a stabbing in the jail while awaiting trial on a capital case.)

A pending state parole violation does not trigger defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights in federal court even though the parole violation and the later federal charges all stem from the same bank robbery. (United States v. Mandley (9th Cir. 1974) 502 F.3rd 1103.)

Neither having an attorney for purposes of extradition nor the existence of an arrest warrant (absent the filing of a criminal complaint or indictment in court) triggers the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (People v. Wheelock (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 561, 565-569; United States v. Yousef (2nd Cir. 2003) 327 F.3rd 56, 142, fn. 66; DeSilva v. DiLeonardi (7th Cir. 1999) 181 F.3rd 865, 868-869; Chewning v. Rogerson (8th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3rd 418, 420; Judd v. Vose (1st Cir. 1987) 813 F.2nd 494, 497; Anderson v. Alameida (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3rd 1175.)

P.C. § 804, in making reference to a prosecution having been “commenced” when an arrest or bench warrant is issued, applies to the running of a “statute of limitations” and not the Sixth Amendment. (People v. Wheelock, supra, at pp. 565-566.)

The “Closely Related,” “Inextricably Intertwined,” or “Inextricably Enmeshed” Doctrine:

Old Rule: “(T)he Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to interrogations on new charges where ‘the pending charge is so inextricably intertwined with the charge under investigation that the right to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense.’ (United States v. Hines 963 F.2nd 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1992).) (United States v. Doherty (6th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3rd 769, 776.)
This theory was the product of some lower courts’ interpretation of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, *Maine v. Moulton* (1985) 474 U.S. 159 [88 L.Ed.2nd 481], where defendant had already been indicted for theft when interrogated and later charged with burglary, based upon the same circumstances; and *Brewer v. Williams* (1977) 430 U.S. 387 [51 L.Ed.2nd 424], where defendant was convicted of murder based upon statements obtained after his indictment for kidnapping of the same victim: Both cases reversed.

See also *United States v. Covarrubias* (9th Cir. 1999) 179 F.3rd 1219: Examining and comparing all of the facts and circumstances relating to the conduct involved, including the identity of the persons involved (including victims) and the timing, motive and location of the crimes, defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights were violated when defendants were questioned by I.N.S. concerning a federal transporting of illegal aliens charge after being arraigned in state court on a charge of kidnapping where one of the transported illegal aliens was the victim of the kidnapping.

*New Rule:* There is no such thing as “closely related” “inextricably intertwined, or “inextricably enmeshed.”

The “inextricably intertwined” theory was first called into question in *People v. Keller* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 40. Per the Third District Court of Appeal, absent a finding that officers questioned a charged suspect about the exact same facts and circumstances which serve as the basis for the charges already filed, *McNeil v. Wisconsin* (1991) 501 U.S 171 [115 L.Ed.2nd 158], holding that the Sixth Amendment is “offense-specific” (i.e., applies only to the charges actually filed in court), the Sixth Amendment will not prevent the use of the defendant’s responses in a separate trial on any newly filed, but different charges, even though they may be factually related.

The United States Supreme Court settled the issue altogether in *Texas v. Cobb* (2001) 532 U.S. 162 [149 L.Ed.2nd 321], where it was held that there is no such theory as “closely related” or “inextricably intertwined.”

In *Cobb*, the High Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, found that there is no legal basis for an exception to the “offense-specific” rule of *McNeil*. Rather, whether
or not an uncharged offense falls under the protection of the *Sixth Amendment* right-to-an-attorney provisions because of the charging of another factually related offense is tested by the same standards as is used in determining the applicability of the *Fifth Amendment* “Double Jeopardy” clause.

*Blockburger v. United States* (1932) 284 U.S. 299 [76 L.Ed. 306] provides the double jeopardy test: i.e., double jeopardy does not preclude separately prosecuting each case so long as each charge “requires proof of an addition fact which the other does not.” (*Id.*, at p. 304 [76 L.Ed. at p. 309].) In other words, is one charge a “lesser included offense” of the other? If so, then, and only then, does arraigning a defendant on one charge trigger the *Sixth Amendment* protections as to both.

*Cobb* involved the questioning of a burglary suspect about the murder of the burglary victims when it was determined, after defendant was arraigned on the burglary charge, that he was also responsible for the disappearance of the residents of the house he burglarized. Doing so did not violate the *Sixth Amendment*.

See also *People v. Slayton* (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1076, where questioning defendant about a residential burglary, after he had been arraigned on a charge of driving the burglary victim’s car taken in that same burglary, was held to be proper (although the charge of V.C. § 10851 [taking] had to be dismissed where he had already been arraigned on a charge of V.C. § 10851 [driving] for the same vehicle).

Problems:

Keeping the Offenses Separate: The problem for the interrogator will often be to keep the questioned suspect from talking about the pending case protected by *Massiah*. The interrogator's intent to discuss only the unprotected crimes must be made clear to the suspect and strictly adhered to throughout the interview.

Ethical Issues: Prosecutors must also be wary of *Rule 2-100* of the *California Rules of Professional Conduct*, which
prohibits any communication, directly or indirectly, with a defendant on a pending charge without the consent of the defendant's attorney, except as “authorized by law.” The application of this rule is subject to some conflict:

This rule is not implicated when an attorney represents the defendant on a separate, unrelated charge. ([People v. Maury](2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 408; the Court erroneously referring to [Rule 7-103](#), which is actually the former version of [Rule 2-100](#).)

Whether or not [Rule 2-100](#) applies to uncharged criminal suspects is still at issue. (See [United States v. Talao](9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3rd 1133.)

The Supreme Court has ruled that a prosecutor’s ethical standards dealing with contacting represented defendants (e.g., [The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 4.2](#)) are not applicable to police officers. ([Montejo v. Louisiana](May 26, 2009) 556 U.S. 778 [173 L.Ed.2nd 955].)

The California Attorney General is of the opinion that [Rule 2-100](#) does not prohibit a prosecutor’s (or his investigator’s) contact with an uncharged defendant who has retained legal counsel. This conclusion is based upon an analysis of subd. (c)(3) of [Rule 2-100](#) which provides that “This rule shall not prohibit . . . communications otherwise authorized by law,” and prior case authority holding that prosecutors should not be inhibited in their duties by a rule prohibiting such contacts. ([75 Ops.Cal. Atty.Gen. 223](1992))

The Ninth Circuit is of the same opinion, at least where there is no direct communication between the defendant and the prosecutor. Also, the use of fake subpoenas, provided to defendant by an undercover agent, did not make the police the “alter-ego” of the prosecution. ([United States v. Carona](9th Cir. 2011) 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 319.)

Also, Subd. (c)(1) of [Rule 2-100](#) does not prohibit a party’s “(c)ommunication with a public officer.” It is
arguable that an elected district attorney comes within the “public officer” exception in a situation where a charged defendant contacts the District Attorney and requests to speak to him or her without the defense attorney’s knowledge. (See People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1155, fn. 5.)

When Attaches: A subject’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the filing of a “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment” and continues even if released from custody so long as that case against him exists (i.e., through the completion of post-conviction appeal). (See Massiah v. United States, supra.)


A criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a magistrate judge, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Attachment does not also require that a prosecutor (as distinct from a police officer) be aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its conduct. (Rothgery v. Gillespie (2008) 554 U.S. 191 [171 L.Ed.2nd 366]; “a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”)

A criminal suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not implicated until that point where he has been formally charged in court; i.e., “after the first formal charging proceeding.” (Italics added; People v. Woods (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 929, 939-941.)

As to whether the filing of a criminal “complaint” is sufficient to trigger one’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see discussion, “Filing of a Complaint,” below.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled, however, that if an officer first advises a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and obtains a waiver of that right, there is no error in talking to the defendant without the presence of his attorney, even after his arraignment. (See Montejo v. Louisiana (May 26, 2009) 556 U.S. 778 [173 L.Ed.2nd 955].)
Rights Applicable to All “Critical Stages:” After a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, he or she has a right to the advice of counsel at all “critical stages” of the proceedings, defined as “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused right to a fair trial.” *(Holloway v. Arkansas* (1978) 435 U.S. 475 [55 L.Ed.2nd 426]; *United States v. Wade* (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 226 [18 L.Ed.2nd 1149, 1157].)

A criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of a prosecution; i.e., “where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.” *(Mempo v. Rhay* (1967) 389 U.S. 128 [19 L.Ed.2nd 336].)

This is normally from defendant’s initial court appearance and arraignment through the completion of his first appeal. (See *United States v. Wade*, supra.)

The “critical stages” of a criminal prosecution typically extend, therefore, from arraignment (and perhaps even before arraignment; see below) through the completion of the first appeal. *(Douglas v. California* (1963) 372 U.S. 353 [9 L.Ed.2nd 811].) Between these two events, a criminal defendant has been held to be entitled to an attorney at:

- Interrogation. *(Montejo v. Louisiana* (May 26 2009) 556 U.S. 778 [173 L.Ed.2nd 955].)
- Preliminary Examination. *(Coleman v. Alabama* (1970) 399 U.S. 1 [26 L.Ed.2nd 387].)
- Juvenile Court Proceedings. *(In re Gault* (1967) 387 U.S. 1 [18 L.Ed.2nd 527].)
- A Parole Revocation Hearing. *(Morrissey v. Brewer* (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [33 L.Ed.2nd 484].)
- Trial: A criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at any criminal trial where an accused is actually deprived of liberty. *(Argersinger v. Hamlin* (1972) 407 U.S. 25 [32 L.Ed.2nd 530].) However, even though incarceration is an option, if none is imposed, there is no constitutional right to the assistance of an attorney. *(Scott v. Illinois* (1979) 440 U.S. 367 [59 L.Ed.2nd 383].)
- Appeal. *(Douglas v. California*, supra.)
Certain events are not considered to be “Critical Stages:”

Consent to Search: Requesting a consent to search is not a “critical stage” requiring the assistance of counsel. (United States v. Kon YuLeung (2nd Cir. 1990) 910 F.2nd 33, 38-40, consent valid despite having been indicted; United States v. Hidalgo (11th Cir. 1993) 7 F.3rd 1566, 1570.)

But see Tidwell v. Superior Court (1971) 17 Cal.App.3rd 780, 789, where it was ruled that obtaining a consent search from a charged juvenile was a Sixth Amendment violation.

Preindictment Lineup: A preindictment lineup is not a “critical stage” requiring the presence of defense counsel. (Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682 [32 L.Ed. 2nd 411].)

California law still requires counsel at a preindictment/pre-arraignment lineup (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3rd 336.), but does not exclude evidence of identification obtained at the lineup even when conducted in violation of this rule. (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1222.)

Booking Questions: Questioning a person to obtain routine biographical information at the subject’s booking does not involve an attempt to elicit incriminating information, and therefore does not constitute a Sixth Amendment violation even though done without his attorney being present. (United States v. Godinez (6th Cir. 1997) 114 F.3rd 583, 589.)

Collection of Evidence: Defendant is not entitled to the presence of counsel during the collection of a urine sample after an arrest for driving under the influence. (United States v. Edmo (9th Cir. 1998) 140 F.3rd 1289, 1293.)

Sex Registration: Defendant registering as a sex registrant (per P.C. § 290(a)) at a police station is not entitled to the assistance of his attorney in that the process is not the equivalent to a custodial interrogation, and is not a critical stage requiring the assistance of an attorney. (People v. Sanchez (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1245-1246.)

During Investigation: After defendant had received a “target letter” (telling him he was the target of a criminal investigation), after depositions were taken from material witnesses, and during
the time when defendant had retained counsel, but prior to being indicted, is not a critical stage providing defendant with a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel protection. (United States v. Hayes (9th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3rd 663.)

“(T)he right to counsel of a person who has not so requested does not arise when he is ‘under investigation,’ but rather the right attaches when the process has shifted from being one of investigation to one of accusation [Citations.]” (In re Brindie (1979) 91 Cal.App.3rd 660.)

An extradition proceeding does not trigger one’s Sixth Amendment protections. (Anderson v. Alameida (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3rd 1175; People v. Wheelock (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 561, 565-569.)

A pre-trail status conference merely confirming the trial date is not a “critical stage” requiring competence counsel. (United States v. Benford (9th Cir. 2009) 574 F.3rd 1228, 1231-1233.)

A court hearing where the court grants the prosecution’s motion to collect a DNA sample from the defendant, where the defendant fails to show any prejudice. (McNeal v. Adams (9th Cir. 2010) 623 F.3rd 1283.)

When the Sixth Amendment Has Not Attached:

Preparing to arrest defendant while search warrants are being executed at his home and businesses does not trigger defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (People v. Woods (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 929, 939-941.)

The Sixth Amendment is not implicated merely because an informant is being used to pump the defendant for information while, unbeknownst to the defendant, the scene is surrounded by law enforcement officers waiting to arrest him and while search warrants are being executed at the defendant’s residence and businesses. The Court noted that a criminal suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not implicated until that point where he has been formally charged in court; i.e., “after the first formal charging proceeding.” (Ibid.)

The fact that an officer deliberately delays making an arrest until after a “non-custodial” interrogation can be completed is irrelevant. The suspect has no right to an earlier arrest so as to trigger his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. “There is no constitutional right to be arrested.” (See Hoffa
Arraignment of a defendant in an Indian tribal court does not trigger the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an attorney when later prosecuted in a federal district court. (*United States v. Charley* (9th Cir. 2005) 396 F.3rd 1074, 1082-1083.)

Because the “Bill of Rights,” including the Sixth Amendment, does not apply to Indian tribes, “since the Indian tribes are ‘distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original rights’ [Citation],” a tribal court arraignment does not trigger the defendant’s Sixth Amendment protections. (*United States v. Doherty* (6th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3rd 769, 777-783; defendant questioned by federal investigators after his arraignment in tribal court.)

Civil proceedings in Juvenile Court to determine the placement of a child, where the minor was suspected of molesting a child and was appointed an attorney, does not shield him from questioning by criminal investigators. The Sixth Amendment right to an attorney only attached after being charged with the offense in a criminal court. (*People v. Chutan* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1276.)

Neither having an attorney for purposes of extradition nor the existence of an arrest warrant, absent the filing of a case, triggers the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (*People v. Wheelock* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 561, 565-569; *United States v. Yousef* (2nd Cir. 2003) 327 F.3rd 56, 142, fn. 66; *DeSilva v. DiLeonardi* (7th Cir. 1999) 181 F.3rd 865, 868-869; *Chewning v. Rogerson* (8th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3rd 418, 420; *Judd v. Vose* (1st Cir. 1987) 813 F.2nd 494, 497; *Anderson v. Alameida* (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3rd 1175.)

P.C. § 804, in making reference to a prosecution being commenced when an arrest or bench warrant is issued, applies to the running of a “statute of limitations” and not the Sixth Amendment. (*People v. Wheelock*, supra, at pp. 565-566.)

*Note:* The existence of an arrest warrant, however, may mean that a complaint has been filed with the court. See below for a discussion as to whether the filing of a complaint triggers a defendant’s Sixth Amendment trial rights.

A couple of federal cases seem to be out of step with the above rules:

A sealed, secret indictment, unknown to the defendant, when defendant had already retained counsel, was held to be sufficient to trigger defendant’s
Sixth Amendment rights. (*United States v. Arnold* (3rd Cir. 1997) 106 F.3rd 37, 40.)

See also *United States v. Harrison* (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3rd 1206; a case where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal determined that an uncharged criminal suspect’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was questioned after:

- The defendant retained counsel on an ongoing basis to assist with a pending criminal investigation;
- The government knew, or should have known, that the defendant had an ongoing legal representation relating to the subject of that investigation; and
- The eventual indictment brought charges precisely anticipated by the scope of the pre-indictment investigation.

Filing of a “Complaint”: Most of the appellate authority, above, only talks about the initiation of criminal proceedings by “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” (See *Kirby v. Illinois* (1972) 406 U.S. 682, 689 [32 L.Ed.2d 411, 417], above.) The filing of a “complaint” in state court is typically not mentioned. An issue may arise as to whether the simple filing of a complaint, such as when necessary to obtain an arrest warrant but without the defendant making a court appearance, comes within the “formal charge” provision.

There has for some time been state authority to the effect that filing a complaint does in fact constitute the initiation of criminal proceedings against the defendant, triggering the protections of the Sixth Amendment. (*People v. Engert* (1987) 193 Cal.App.3rd 1518.)

See also *People v. Lebell* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3rd 772: Surreptitiously interrogating a criminal suspect who had been charged by complaint, but had not been informed of this fact, without advising him of his right to an attorney, is a Sixth Amendment violation.

And see *People v. Henderson* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3rd 1129, where the Court did not contest the validity of the rule in *Engert and Lebell*, but merely held that the defendant’s statements were admissible in that defendant, knowing that a complaint had been filed, waived her right to the assistance of counsel and was not subjected to any “trickery of deceptive means . . . by the police.”

And see *People v. Wader* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 653-654, where it was held, without analyzing the issue, that the filing of the complaint had triggered defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but that because
he had not yet “invoked” such a right, law enforcement was not precluded from initiating an interrogation.

And see *People v. Frye* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 987, where it was assumed, without arguing the issue, that the filing of a complaint triggered the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Federal authority has held to the contrary, specifically holding that the filing of a complaint does not trigger the Sixth Amendment. (*United States v. Duvall* (2nd Cir. 1976) 537 F.2nd 15, 22; *United States v. Pace* (9th Cir. 1986) 833 F.2nd 1307, 1312; *United States v. Langley* (11th Cir. 1988) 848 F.2nd 152, 153.)

However, in these federal cases, it is noted that the “principal function of a (federal) complaint ‘is as a basis for an application for an arrest warrant’” (See *United States v. Pace*, supra; and *United States v. Duvall*, supra.), and, arguably, not necessarily the formal initiation of a criminal case as occurs under California law. (See P.C. § 949)

“(E)very (federal) circuit that has considered the issue has concluded that a federal complaint does not qualify as such, primarily because of its limited roll as the precursor to an arrest warrant (as opposed to a ‘formal charge’). (Citations, including *United States v. Pace*, supra., omitted)” *United States v. Boskic* (1st Cir. 2008) 545 F.3rd 69, 83, referring to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 3 & 4, noting that a “federal complaint” is merely a statement of probable cause filed by a law enforcement officer, without the necessary participation of a prosecutor, as a legal prerequisite to the issuance of an arrest warrant.)

And see *Anderson v. Alameida* (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3rd 1175, where it was held that a California state complaint, filed by a police officer for the purpose of obtaining an arrest warrant, did not trigger the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.

The issue was recently met head-on in *People v. Viray* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186, where the Sixth District Court of Appeal found that the filing of a complaint does in fact trigger one’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

*Note:* A possible distinction between *Viray* and the federal decisions, including *Anderson v. Alameida*, although not discussed in either case, is that in *Viray*, the complaint was filed by a prosecutor and intended to be the initiation of the criminal
prosecution of the defendant pursuant to P.C. § 806. In *Anderson*, the complaint was apparently filed by a law enforcement officer for the sole purpose of obtaining an arrest warrant, as authorized by P.C. § 813. *Viray* and *Anderson* can be reconciled if it is assumed that the two procedures were intended to set up different uses of a complaint.

It is also arguable that *Rothgery v. Gillespie* (2008) 554 U.S. 191 [171 L.Ed.2nd 366], holding that; “a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the *Sixth Amendment* right to counsel,” has overruled, by implication, *Viray*.

But see *Patterson v. Illinois* (1988) 487 U.S. 285 [101 L.Ed.2nd 261], noting that the filing of an indictment triggered defendant’s *Sixth Amendment* right to counsel. Assuming *Patterson* is still good law (and there’s no reason for assuming that it is not), then *Viray* is also still good law, and *Rothgery* only applies to one way to trigger a defendant’s *Sixth Amendment* rights without intended to exclude others.

*Waiver of Sixth Amendment Rights:* A charged criminal defendant may “waive” his right to counsel, so long as such a waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. (*Johnson v. Zerbst* (1938) 304 U.S. 1458, 164 [82 L.Ed.1461, 1466]; *Patterson v. Illinois* (1988) 487 U.S. 285, 292, fn. 4 [101 L.Ed.2nd 261, 272]; *Coughlan v. United States* (9th Cir. 1968) 391 F.3rd 371.)

“In order to invoke the right of self-representation successfully, a defendant's waiver of counsel must be ‘timely, not for the purposes of delay, unequivocal, and knowing and intelligent.’ (Cites omitted; *McCormick v. Adams* (9th Cir. 2010) 621 F.3rd 970, 976.)

“If instigated by an accused specifically waiving the right to counsel, interrogation out of counsel’s presence may be permissible.” (*People v. Manson* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3rd 102, 164-165.)

*Burden of Proof:* It is incumbent upon the State to prove “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (*Johnson v. Zerbst*, supra; *Brewer v. Williams* (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404 [51 L.Ed.2nd 424, 439].)

It is the state’s burden to prove a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent relinquishment of the defendant’s *Sixth Amendment* right to

“This strict standard applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings.”  (Brewer v. Williams, supra, at p. 404 [51 L.Ed.2nd at p. 440]; citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1972) 412 U.S. 218, 238-240 [36 L.Ed.2nd 854, 869-870].)

In Court:  A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to waive the assistance of counsel and represent himself, so long as he is sufficiently mentally competent to understand what it is he is giving up.  (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2nd 562].)

“Generally, ‘[a] trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if three conditions are met:’”

- The defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having been appraised of the dangers of self-representation.
- Defendant must make his request unequivocally.
- Defendant must make his request within a reasonable time before trial.


A “Faretta waiver:”

In order for a “Faretta waiver” to be “knowing and intelligent,” the trial court must insure that he understands:

- The nature of the charges against him;
- The possible penalties;
- The dangers and disadvantages of self-representation;
- The defendant’s inability to rely upon the trial court to give personal instruction on courtroom procedure
or to provide the assistance that otherwise would have been rendered by counsel.


Defendant should also be told that:

- Self-representation is almost always unwise and that the defense he conducts might be to his detriment;

- He will have to follow the same rules that govern attorneys;

- The prosecution will be represented by experienced, professional counsel who will have a significant advantage over him in terms of skill, training, education, experience, and ability;

- The count may terminate his right to represent himself if he engages in disruptive conduct; and

- He will lose the right to appeal his case on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.

(People v. Phillips (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 422, 428; noting that the above list is not necessarily exhaustive. See also People v. Sullivan, supra, at p. 546.)

A defendant who chooses to represent himself in a felony case must be advised by the court of his right to the assistance of counsel on at least two separate occasions:

- When first brought before a magistrate and advised of the filing of the complaint. (P.C. § 859)

- After the preliminary examination when the defendant is arraigned in superior court on the information. (P.C. § 987)

A defendant must understand his constitutional right to have a lawyer perform certain core functions, and the possible
consequences of mishandling these core functions and the lawyer’s superior ability to handle them. (United States v. Gerritsen (9th Cir. 2009) 571 F.3rd 1001; such understanding shown where the record indicated that defendant had represented himself in at least six jury trials in state court and a civil trial in federal court.)

It is the defendant’s burden to show that he was not properly advised and that his waiver was not “knowingly and intelligent.” (People v. Sullivan, supra, at p. 546-552; noting that where the record is not available, defendant has failed to meet his burden.)

There is no requirement that the defendant be advised of the factors that are unique to a death penalty case. “The trial court is not required to ensure that the defendant is aware of legal concepts such as the various burdens of proof, the rules of evidence, or the fact that the pursuit of one avenue of defense might foreclose another . . . .” (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 274-278.)

At footnote 10, pg. 277, the Riggs Court notes that “the defendant’s technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to the court’s assessment of the defendant’s knowing exercise of the right to defend himself,” quoting from People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 121, 128.

A defendant who represents herself cannot later complain on appeal that an issue was not properly raised at the trial court level, and thus has waived that issue, even if she had counsel at one point who had the opportunity to raise the issue and should have, so long as she also had the opportunity to raise it herself while representing herself. (People v. Polk (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1195-1196; i.e., an inadequate advisal of her Miranda rights which, because not raised at the trial level, allowed for the admission of incriminating statements that should have been suppressed.)

Failure of the court to advise a pro. per. defendant of his right to the assistance of a lawyer is error (People v. Sohrab (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 89, 95-102.), but does not necessarily require reversal of a subsequent conviction. (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346.)

However, an improper denial of a request to represent one’s self is “not amenable to harmless error analysis. The right is either
respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”  \textit{(McKaskle v. Wiggins} (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 177, fn. 8 [79 L.Ed.2}\textsuperscript{nd} 122].

Making a motion to substitute counsel (i.e, a “Marsden motion.” 
\textit{People v. Marsden} (1970) 2 Cal.3\textsuperscript{rd} 118.) does not, by itself, encompass a motion to represent oneself as well. Failure to separate the two and specifically move to represent oneself waives the issue. \textit{(Robinson v. Kramer} (9\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 2009) 588 F.3\textsuperscript{rd} 1212.)

A court’s promise that the issue would be revisited “at any time” should the defendant change his mind was not sufficient to show that his waiver of counsel was not intelligently made when the record was clear that he was determined to represent himself even before the court made this statement. \textit{(McCormick v. Adams} (9\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 2010) 621 F.3\textsuperscript{rd} 970.)

A defendant’s right to represent himself, however, may be forfeited through his own misconduct, unless the misconduct is unrelated to and independent of the underlying prosecution and thus presents no danger of impairing the integrity of the trial. \textit{(Ferrel v. Superior Court} (1978) 20 Cal.3\textsuperscript{rd} 888; abusing his pro. per. status by using his legal runner for gambling purposes, and by damaging a jail telephone, insufficient cause to revoke defendant’s pro. per. status.)

Demonstrating his inability to follow the court’s rules by being disruptive and refusing to comply with the court’s orders is sufficient cause to deny a defendant his right to represent himself. \textit{(People v. Watts} (2009) 173 Cal.App.4\textsuperscript{th} 621.)

One form of serious and obstructionist misconduct is witness intimidation, which, by its very nature, compromises the fact-finding process and constitutes a quintessential “subversion of the core concept of a trial.” \textit{(United States v. Dougherty} (D.C. Cir. 1972) 473 F.2\textsuperscript{nd} 1113, 1125.)

A defendant’s forfeiture of his right to represent himself may result from activities outside the courtroom. “Ultimately, the effect, not the location, of the misconduct and its impact on the core integrity of the trial will determine whether termination is warranted.” \textit{People v. Carson} (2005) 35 Cal.4\textsuperscript{th} 1, 9.)

Factors to consider include:
• The availability and suitability of alternative sanctions;

• Whether the defendant has been warned that particular misconduct will result in termination of in propria persona status;

• Whether the defendant has “intentionally sought to disrupt and delay his trial.” (Id., at p. 10.)

A waiver of one’s request to represent himself may be found where defendant has abandoned the request, as determined by his subsequent conduct. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 929; People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 609-612.)

In order to invoke his right to represent himself, defendant must make an unequivocal assertion of that right (People v. Tena, supra, at pp. 607-609.) within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1365; Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521; People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 690.)

A defendant’s objection to his attorney’s request for a continuance, indicating to the court that he is prepared to proceed without the assistance of his attorney, is not an unequivocal request to represent himself. (Woods v. Sinclair (9th Cir. 2011) 655 F.3rd 886, 896-899.)

Defendant’s request to relieve his attorney and to represent himself two weeks before trial, where granting it would necessarily delay the trial and disrupt the proceedings, and when there are elderly witnesses, was properly denied. (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 711-728.)

“The court faced with a motion for self-representation should evaluate not only whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but also the defendant’s conduct and other words. Because the court should draw every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant’s conduct or words reflecting ambivalence about self-representation may support the court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion. A motion for self-representation made in passing anger or frustration, an ambivalent motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the orderly administration of justice may be denied.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23.)
Asking to represent himself after being frustrated by a court commissioner’s refusal to order defendant’s public defender to subpoena certain witnesses for preliminary examination, and then later a judge’s denial of his motion to have his attorney replaced by a new attorney, where the issue was thereafter abandoned, held to be “impulsive reactions” to not getting his way as opposed to an unequivocal desire to represent himself. (*People v. Tena*, *supra*).

*Faretta* motion made after a preliminary examination was underway was timely because defendant specifically did not want a continuance and indicated that he was ready to proceed without any delays. (*Moon v. Superior Court*, *supra*, at p. 1531.)

A defendant does not have an absolute constitutional right to reappointment of counsel mid-trial after his intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. (*John-Charles v. California* (9th Cir. 2011) 646 F.3d 1243, 1248-1251.)

Issues that are *not* proper reasons for denying a defendant’s motion to represent himself:

A defendant’s ability to effectively represent himself is not a proper consideration under *Faretta*. (*People v. Welch* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 733.)

A defendant’s technical legal knowledge is also not a reason to deny his right to represent himself. (*People v. Dunkle* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 908.)

Defendant having been a “slow learner” in school, and having a limited education, therefore, is not cause to deny a *Faretta* motion. (*People v. Doolin* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454.)

A jailed defendant may still represent himself in a murder trial even though disciplinary restrictions would hinder his trial preparation. (*People v. Butler* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814; death row inmate on trial in this case for stabbing to death another inmate.)

However: “The Constitution does not forbid States from insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who suffer from sever mental illness to the point where they
are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”  

A state, however, may constitutionally allow a “gray-area” defendant to waive his right to counsel and represent himself, if it chooses to do so.  (Id., at p. 173; citing Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 [125 L.Ed.2nd 321] where the issue was whether defendant was sufficiently competent to plead guilty.)

“Edwards does not compel a trial court to deny a defendant the exercise of his or her right to self-representation; it simply Permits a trial court to require representation for a defendant who lacks mental competency to conduct trial proceedings.”  (United States v. Ferguson (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3rd 1060, 1070, fn. 6.)

Where the record reflects the trial court’s recognition that defendant’s competence to stand trial was not the test for determining whether defendant had the mental capacity to represent himself, allowing him to do so was not an abuse of discretion.  (United States v. Thompson (9th Cir. 2009) 587 F.3rd 1165, 1171-1173.)

California courts may deny self-representation when the United States Constitution permits such denial.  California courts have discretion to deny self-representation to those defendants who, although competent to stand trial, may not represent themselves because to refuse to recognize such discretion would be inconsistent with California’s own law.  Because California law provided no statutory or constitutional right of self-representation, such denial also does not violate a state right.  The Supreme Court here determined that the trial court acted within its discretion in revoking defendant’s self-representation status.  The trial judge, who had permitted defendant to represent himself for several months, revoked defendant’s self-representation status following a very careful and thorough discussion.  The trial judge had previously appointed three mental health experts to evaluate defendant’s competence to stand trial and had heard their testimony at the trial competency hearing.  The record supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant, although competent to stand trial, was not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself.  (People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519.)
A defendant who asks to represent himself, or who asks for an attorney after already being granted the right to represent himself, such request being made mid-trial, may be granted that right by the court in exercising its discretion. The factors for the court to consider include, but are not limited to:

- Defendant’s prior history in the substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation.
- The reasons set forth for the request.
- The length and stage of the trial proceedings.
- Disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to ensure from the granting of such a motion, and
- The likelihood of defendant’s effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own attorney.


But a request for reappointment of an attorney mid-trial may be denied in the trial court’s discretion as untimely, and causing a “significant disruption” already set to begin with a jury selected. *(People v. Lawrence* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186, 191-196.)*

E.g. In *People v. Lawrence, supra*, it was held by the appellate court to be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to allow defendant to have a court-appointed attorney when, during and then again after jury selection, defendant asked for an attorney while indicating to the court that voir dire made him realize that he couldn’t competently represent himself. This is despite the fact that he had properly waived counsel just before jury selection and no attorney (including his previously retained attorney) was available to help him at that time without causing a two-week delay in the trial. The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal finding the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for reappointment of an attorney was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances.

In a death penalty case, the guilt and the penalty phase are considered to be one trial. Therefore, a motion to represent oneself between phases is considered to be untimely, and subject to the discretion of the court. *(People v. Mayfield* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 810.)
The same rule is true for a motion to represent oneself for sentencing, after the verdict in the penalty phase. 
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 455.)

Asking for a continuance, when it implicates a defendant’s **Sixth Amendment** right to counsel, requires the court to balance several factors in determining whether denial of a continuance was “fair and reasonable:”

- Whether the continuance would inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties;
- Whether other continuances have been granted;
- Whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay;
- Whether the delay is the defendant’s fault; and
- Whether a denial would prejudice the defendant.

(United States v. Thompson (9th Cir. 2009) 587 F.3rd 1165, 1173-1175; citing United States v. Studley (9th Cir. 1986) 783 F.2nd 934, 938.)

In Thompson, denial of a motion to reappoint counsel and for a continuance was properly denied where 3½ years had passed since the initial pretrial conference, trial was scheduled for the next day, and defendant had already been granted 12 or 13 prior continuances. Defendant’s conduct was determined to be “clearly dilatory.”

After defendant indicated a desire to represent himself, responding to the court’s warnings that the trial was to begin the next day and that he might not be ready to represent himself that early, defendant agreed that the court “had a point.” The court never conducted further hearings into how much time defendant would need, if any, to be prepared, nor provided any specific reasons for denying defendant’s motion to represent himself. Failure to do so, while failing to honor defendant’s request to represent himself, was error.
(United States v. Farias (9th Cir. 2010) 618 F.3rd 1049, 1051-1055.)

A defendant is entitled to represent himself at sentencing, and even re-sentencing after the case is remanded by an appellate court for resentencing. But because this proceeding is not likely to be
“structural” (as it might be at trial), an inappropriate denial of this right may be held to be non-prejudicial. (*United States v. Maness* (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3rd 894.)

**Advisory Counsel:** Once the court has determined that a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel is knowing and intelligent, it may appoint standby or “advisory” counsel to assist the pro per defendant without infringing on his right to self-representation. (*United States v. Moreland* (9th Cir. 2007) 509 F.3rd 1201; 1208-1209; citing *McKaskle v. Wiggins* (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 176-177 [79 L.Ed.2nd 122].)

A defendant who waives his right to counsel, however, does not have a right to advisory counsel. (*United States v. Salemo* (9th Cir. 1996) 81 F.3rd 1453, 1460; *United States v. Kienenberger* (9th Cir. 1994) 13 F.3rd 1354-1356.)

The role of standby counsel is vague and undefined, and the defendant must retain control over his case. (*McKaskle v. Wiggins*, *supra*, at pp. 177-178; *United States v. Moreland*, *supra*.)

The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s requests for the appointment of co-counsel. Defendant, who represented himself during the pretrial stages of the proceedings but eventually chose to have an attorney represent him for part of the guilt phase of the trial, failed to make any compelling showing that the appointment of co-counsel instead of advisory counsel was justified. (*People v. Moore* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1119-1123.)

Defendant also had complained that his access to a law library was restricted and his phone access had been limited. This is due to discovery of a “shank” found in his cell. The shank was fashioned from a metal rod taken from a typewriter in the library. “(A) defendant who is representing himself or herself may not be placed in the position of presenting a defense without access to a telephone, law library, runner, investigator, advisory counsel, or any other means of developing a defense.’’”

Although the general rule is that the federal and state constitutional provisions concerning the assistance of counsel for criminal defendants include the right to access reasonably necessary defense services, this privilege for a pro per defendant may be restricted “for cause,” depending upon the circumstances. The Court found that despite the
restrictions, defendant had been provided with reasonable resources to present a defense.  (*Id.*, at pp. 1124-1127.)

Other Waiver Issues: A charged criminal defendant may also waive his right to counsel, at least to a limited extent, by raising certain issues during trial that trigger a prosecution expert’s right to administer certain tests to the accused for the purpose of determining the validity of the issue raised by defendant. For instance:

Pleading “*not guilty by reason of insanity*” carries with it a court obligation to appoint two psychiatrists or licensed psychologists with a doctoral degree in psychology for the purpose of interviewing and evaluating the defendant’s mental state, thus waiving the defendant’s *Sixth Amendment* right to the extent necessary to permit a proper examination of that condition.  (*Centeno v. Superior Court [Los Angeles] (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30; P.C. § 1027*)

Similarly, a capital case defendant who claims mental retardation, done for the purpose of avoiding the death penalty (See *Atkins v. Virginia* (2002) 536 U.S. 304 [153 L.Ed.2nd 335].), may be tested by a prosecution-selected expert for the purpose of rebutting such an allegation.  (*Centeno v. Superior Court [Los Angeles], supra; P.C. § 1376.*)

The expert’s testimony, however, is admissible only for the purpose of litigating these issues in rebuttal to the defendant’s presentation of evidence attempting to prove a mental defense or mental retardation.  (*People v. Danis, supra; Centeno v. Superior Court [Los Angeles], supra; P.C. § 1376(b)(1))

*But*, note that cases allowing for a prosecution psychiatric expert to interview and evaluate a charged criminal defendant when the defendant raises an issue as to a possible mental defect or disease in mitigation to charged offenses (e.g., *People v. Danis* (1973) 31 Cal.App.3rd 782.) were overruled in *Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096*, where it was held that passage of *Proposition 115* in 1990, enacting *article I, section 30, subdivision (c)* of the *California Constitution*, and *P.C. § 1054* et seq., established the exclusive means of providing discovery (except where provided for in other statutes).
Non-Criminal Hearings: A defendant does not have a Faretta right to represent himself in proceedings other than criminal prosecutions. For example:


Complaining on appeal that the trial court should not have granted him the right to represent himself at an MDO extension hearing, defendant will not be granted relief absent a showing that there was “a reasonable probability” that having an attorney would have made any difference. (People v. Wrentmore, supra, at pp. 929-931.)

Juvenile dependency proceedings. (In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1080, although the court found a statutory right in W&I § 317(b))


Proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (i.e., W&I §§ 6600 et seq.) (People v. Fraser (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1430.)

“When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” (People v Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 204.)
The decision whether to grant a motion to relieve a complaining defendant’s attorney is within the discretion of the trial court. An abuse of discretion will not be found unless the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint a replacement would “substantially impair” the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. \( \text{People v. Roldan} \) (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 681; \( \text{People v. Abilez} \) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 487-488.)

Once a defendant has an opportunity to state his or her reasons for seeking to discharge an appointed attorney, the decision whether or not to grant a motion for substitution of counsel lies within the discretion of the trial judge. The court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Marsden motion “unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.” Substantial impairment of the right to counsel can occur when the appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation or when “the defendant and the attorney have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citation].” \( \text{People v. Clark} \) (2011) 52 Cal.App.4th 856, 912-914.)

\textit{Out of Court:}

\textbf{Suspect Initiates the Questioning:} As when the suspect has previously invoked and later seeks to waive his or her \textbf{Fifth Amendment} rights, a charged criminal suspect may also validly choose to waive his or her \textbf{Sixth Amendment} rights and initiate questioning with law enforcement. \( \text{Edwards v. Arizona} \) (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2nd 378, 385-386]; \( \text{Oregon v. Bradshaw} \) (1983) 462 U.S. 1039 [77 L.Ed.2nd 405]; \( \text{Wyrick v. Fields} \) (1982) 459 U.S. 42 [74 L.Ed.2nd 214]; see also \( \text{People v. McClary} \) (1977) 20 Cal.3rd 218, 226; \( \text{Patterson v. Illinois} \) (1988) 487 U.S. 285 [101 L.Ed.2nd 261].)

“\( \text{N} \)othing in the \textbf{Sixth Amendment} prevents a suspect charged with a crime and represented by counsel from voluntarily choosing, on his own, to speak with police in the absence of an attorney.” \( \text{Michigan v. Harvey} \) (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 352 [108 L.Ed.2nd 293, 303]; \( \text{Montejo v.} \)
Even where a defendant has already been appointed counsel on a pending case, he or she may validly choose to talk to law enforcement without the assistance of his or her attorney. (*People v. Stephens* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3rd 575, 583-586.)

The Court also noted the lack of any requirement that the defendant’s attorney be notified prior to complying with defendant’s request to talk to law enforcement. (*Id.*, at p. 583.)

See also; *People v. Arauz* (1970) 5 Cal.App.3rd 523, 530-531: Defendant, who had had an attorney appointed for him at a juvenile hearing, insisted on talking to his parole officer despite warnings that he should talk to his lawyer first: No violation.

And see *Adams v. Aiken* (4th Cir. 1992) 965 F.2nd 1306, 1315-1316; citing *Oregon v. Elstad* (1985) 470 U.S. 298 [84 L.Ed.2nd 222] as its authority: Four days after arrest, and after appointment and consultation with counsel, defendant, against his lawyer’s advice, provided a written confession to the police. Defendant’s written, signed confession, obtained with his attorney’s presence and participation (although contrary to his attorney’s advice), overcame any prior uncoerced *Fifth Amendment* self-incrimination and *Sixth Amendment* right to counsel violations.

A charged criminal defendant (after preliminary examination) who erroneously believed that he was no longer represented by a retained attorney because he had run out of money, validly waived his *Sixth Amendment* rights by contacting the police investigator and sought an interview, at least where he was advised of his *Miranda* rights including the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one. (*People v. Sultana* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3rd 511, 518-521.)

It was noted, at page 521, that the police were under no obligation to notify his retained attorney of his client’s wish to talk.

And it was also noted, at page 521, that the result would be different had the police improperly induced defendant to believe that his privately retained attorney was no longer working for him.
Courts Critical of Contacts Without Attorney: Even when the defendant chooses of his or her own accord to participate in direct communications without the assistance of his/her attorney, California courts have been extremely critical of such activities, particularly when done by (or, arguably, authorized by) the prosecutor. (See *People v. Manson* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3rd 102, 164-165.)

Courts tend to attach greater importance to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an attorney, with correspondingly harsher sanctions when a violation occurs, up to and including outright dismissal of a criminal case. (See *People v. Moore* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 437.)

Again, prosecutors must be wary of Rule 2-100 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct (see also Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct), which prohibits any communication, directly or indirectly, with a defendant on a pending charge without the consent of the defendant's attorney, except as authorized by law. (*United States v. Lopez* (9th Cir. 1993) 4 F.3rd 1455; *Triple A Machine Shop v. State of California* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3rd 131; see above.)

Right to Substitution of Counsel:

A trial court has the discretion to permit a defendant to discharge his appointed counsel and to substitute another attorney during the trial. (*People v. Marsden* (1970) 2 Cal.3rd 118, 123.)

When a defendant asks that his appointed counsel be discharged and that new counsel be appointed, the trial court must provide the defendant with an opportunity to explain to the court the reasons for the request. “(A) judge who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom observations despite a defendant’s offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of counsel.” (*Id.*, at p. 124.)

In determining whether a denial of a Marsden Motion violates one’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires a consideration of three factors:

- Timeliness of the motion;
- Adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and
• Whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.

(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 490-491.)

“A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” (Citations omitted; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786 857; People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 682; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.)

The decision whether to substitute counsel is a discretionary call for the trial court. An appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court’s failure to substitute counsel would “substantially impair” defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 803-804; People v. Taylor, supra.)

“Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an ‘‘irreconcilable conflict.’’ The attorney is the one who has the authority to ‘‘make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.’’ (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 719; People v. Jackson, supra, at p. 688.)”

Requesting a new trial based upon a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not trigger the court’s duty to conduct a Marsden hearing if the defendant’s desire for substitute counsel is not made clear. (People v. Richardson (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 479, 484-485.)

Even if a competency hearing (per P.C. § 1368) is pending, a Marsden hearing much be held. The court “may and indeed must promptly consider a motion for substitution of counsel when the right to effective assistance ‘would be substantially impaired’ if his request were ignored.” (People v. Taylor, supra, at pp. 600-601; citing People v. Stanekowitz (1990) 51 Cal.3rd 72, 88; see also People v. Solorzano (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069-1071.)

However, denial of a request to conduct a Marsden hearing due solely to the pendency of a competency hearing is not prejudicial where the Marsden hearing is later held before
competency is determined. (*People v. Taylor*, *supra*, at p. 601; *People v. Govea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 57.)

Lunging at the defense attorney and referring to her by a vulgar, sexist term, does not necessarily establish that the attorney-client relationship has been irretrievably damaged, and does not require the substitution of counsel. (*People v. Taylor*, *supra*, at p. 600.)

Defendant indicated to the trial court a desire to withdraw his plea of guilty to a charge of cultivation of marijuana. Without holding a *Marsden* hearing or asking defendant to explain his reasons, the trial court appointed conflict counsel for the sole purpose of looking into a plea withdrawal. The Appellate Court held that a trial court was obligated to conduct a *Marsden* hearing on whether to discharge defendant’s trial counsel for all purposes and appoint new counsel when a criminal defendant clearly indicates after conviction a desire to withdraw the plea on the ground of ineffective assistance by current counsel and to obtain a substitute attorney. When such a request was made at any time during criminal proceedings, the trial court was obligated to give the defendant an opportunity to state any grounds for dissatisfaction with current counsel. Upon a showing that the right to counsel had been substantially impaired, substitute counsel had to be appointed as attorney of record for all purposes. The Appellate Court specifically disapproved the procedure of appointing a substitute or conflict attorney solely to evaluate whether a criminal defendant had a legal ground for plea withdrawal on the basis of the current counsel's incompetence. (*People v. Sanchez* (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80.)

**Forfeiture of Right to an Attorney:** It is also possible for a charged criminal defendant to “forfeit” his right to counsel by engaging in “dilatory tactics,” abuse directed towards his attorney, or other misconduct, although, in some circumstances, a forfeiture may be appropriate only after having been warned by the court. (*United States v. Goldberg* (3rd Cir. 1995) 67 F.3rd 1092, 1099-1101; *Gilchrist v. O’Keefe* (2nd Cir. 2001) 260 F.3rd 87.)

“(A)n accused may forfeit his right to counsel by a course of serious misconduct towards counsel that illustrates that lesser measures to protect counsel and appointment of successor counsel is futile.” (*King v. Superior Court* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 929.)

However, a defendant is entitled to “due process,” such as a hearing and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. (*Ibid.*)
The hearing, however, may not be necessary in all circumstances, such as when the defendant has physically assaulted his attorney in open court.  (*United States v. Leggett* (3rd Cir. 1998) 162 F.3rd 237.)

The “*Jackson* Rule:” Law Enforcement Initiated Questioning:

Until May, 2009, it was a constitutional rule that statements obtained from a criminal suspect through a *police-initiated interrogation* after the defendant’s *Sixth Amendment* rights have been triggered by a “*formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment*” (see above), were presumed to be invalid. (*Michigan v. Jackson* (1986) 475 U.S. 625 [89 L.Ed.2nd 631]; see also *Fellers v. United States* (2004) 540 U.S. 519 [157 L.Ed.2nd 1016].)

Known as the “*Jackson Rule,*” an important exception involved the situation where a defendant had been formally charged by the filing of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or an arraignment, but had not yet been to court to formally request the appointment of counsel. In such a case, so long as the defendant has been advised of his right to the assistance of an attorney and a waiver of that right obtained, law enforcement could initiate contact and question the charged criminal defendant. (*Patterson v. Illinois* (1988) 487 U.S. 285 [101 L.Ed.2nd 261].)

*Jackson*, however, was specifically overruled in *Montejo v. Louisiana* (2009) 556 U.S. 778 [173 L.Ed.2nd 955].

In *Montejo*, it was held that an in-custody defendant may be contacted by law enforcement and, after a “*voluntary, knowing, and intelligent*” waiver of his *Fifth* (*Miranda*) and *Sixth* (right to counsel) *Amendment* rights, questioned, even if he has already been arraigned and even if, at arraignment, he has asserted his right to the assistance of counsel.

The *Montejo* Court held that the protections provided by the *Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick* cases (below) are sufficient and that the rule of *Jackson* is superfluous and unnecessary.


suspect who has invoked his *Miranda* right to counsel may not be contacted again unless such contact is initiated by the defendant or he is released from custody.

- **Minnick v. Mississippi** (1990) 498 U.S. 146 [112 L.Ed.2nd 489]; providing that an in-custody suspect who has invoked his *Miranda* right to counsel may not be contacted again unless his attorney is present.

In *Montejo*, it was also noted that neither *Jackson* nor *Edwards* is necessary to protect an out-of-custody defendant because he “is in control, and need only shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering.” Similarly, other “non-interrogative interactions with the State” (e.g., police lineups) do not involve the “inherently compelling pressures” that typically necessitate the need for a rule protecting a defendant from police badgering. An out-of-custody charged criminal defendant, therefore, may also be contacted and, upon advisal of his *Sixth Amendment* right to counsel and a wavier, may also be questioned out of the presence of his attorney. (*Montejo v. Louisiana*, *supra*, at pp. 2090-2091.)

**Admonishment of Rights:** A *Miranda*-style admonishment and waiver has been held “as a general matter” to be enough to waive one’s *Sixth Amendment* right to counsel when questioning a charged criminal suspect.

**Rule:** “The standard for waiver of the *Fifth* and *Sixth Amendment* rights to counsel is the same: the waiver must be (1) voluntary, and (2) a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” (*United States v. Karr* (9th Cir. 1984) 742 F.2nd 493, 495-496; citing *Edwards v. Arizona* (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 [68 L.Ed.2nd 378, 385, *Fifth Amendment*]; and *Brewer v. Williams* (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404 [51 L.Ed.2nd 424, 439-440], *Sixth Amendment*; *Montejo v. Louisiana* (2009) 556 U.S. 778 [173 L.Ed.2nd 955].)

There is no basis for finding the suspect’s *Sixth Amendment* right to counsel to be more important, or deserves greater protection, than his *Fifth Amendment* right to counsel. (*Patterson v. Illinois* (1988) 487 U.S. 285, 297-298 [101 L.Ed.2nd 261].)

There are not a lot of examples yet on what must be said in the form of an admonishment. Probably, merely telling him that a complaint has been filed before admonishing him, and then giving him a standard *Miranda* admonishment and waiver, would be enough:
If the subject knows that an accusatory pleading has been filed against him, a standard *Miranda* admonishment and wavier has been held to be sufficient. (*Patterson v. Illinois* (1988) 487 U.S. 285 [101 L.Ed.2nd 261].)

“As a general matter ... an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in *Miranda* ... has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.” (*Montejo v. Louisiana* (2009) 556 U.S. 778 [173 L.Ed.2nd 955; citing *Patterson*, supra, at 296.)

California authority has held that if the subject does not know that an accusatory pleading has been filed against him, then he should be informed of this fact so that he knows what he is waving. (*People v. Engert* (1987) 193 Cal.App.3rd 1518.)

At least one court has held that a person who wishes to discuss his or her case with law enforcement without the assistance of, or knowledge of, his or her attorney, should be given “a clear and explicit explanation of the Sixth Amendment rights defendant is giving up.” (*United States v. Mohabir* (2nd Cir. 1980) 624 F.2nd 1140, 1150-1153; requiring that his rights be explained by a neutral judicial officer, with an explanation of the significance and seriousness of the charges and the defendant’s position.)

The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically rejected *Mohabir*. (*Patterson v. Illinois*, supra, at p. 295.) Other courts have taken a more lenient view as well, requiring only that the subject receive a full *Miranda* admonishment, including the standard reference to his right to counsel, and be told that there are formal judicial proceedings pending against him. (*United States v. Karr*, supra, at p. 496; explaining that *Mohabir* is a minority position, and describing the many less stringent opinions by other federal circuit courts.)

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that; “As a general matter, . . . an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in *Miranda*, . . . has been sufficiently appraised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing
and intelligent one. [fn. Omitted]” (Patterson v. Illinois, supra, at pp. 295-296 [101 L.Ed.2d at p. 275]; Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 244, 349 [108 L.Ed.2nd 293, 301].)

There has been some Supreme Court dissent from this rule, noting that waivers of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be measured by a stricter standard. (Fields v. Wyrick (1983) 464 U.S. 1020, 1022 [78 L.Ed.2nd 728, 729]; Justice Marshall’s dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari.)

Note: Absent more defining case law, we are certainly on firmer ground if he is also specifically told that charges have been filed against him and that by waiving his Miranda rights he is also waiving his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.

Important: For those cases decided under the rule of Michigan v. Jackson, it is important to note that the rule was but a “prophylactic rule” intended to protect one’s Sixth Amendment rights and was not, when violated, a Sixth Amendment violation in itself. Statements obtained in violation of Jackson, therefore, at least if otherwise voluntarily obtained, are admissible for impeachment purposes should the defendant testify contrary to his statements to the police. (Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 353 [108 L.Ed.2nd 293, 304].)

Use of Undercover Agents and Other Informants:

Rule: Intentionally creating a situation likely to induce an in-custody defendant, represented by counsel appointed at his arraignment, to make incriminating statements by having an undercover agent engage defendant in conversation, is a Sixth Amendment violation. (United States v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264 [65 L.Ed.2nd 115].)

“Knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State’s obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.” (Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 176 [88 L.Ed.2nd 481, 496].)

The intention to generate incriminating statements from the accused will likely be presumed. “Even if the (government) agent’s statement that he did not intend that (the undercover agent) would take affirmative steps to secure incriminating information is accepted (in fact, the undercover agent was specifically instructed not to do so), he (the government agent) must have known that such
propinquity likely would lead to that result.” (United States v. Henry, supra, at p. 271 [65 L.Ed.2nd at p. 122].) Even without questioning the defendant, an informant who “stimulates” conversation with the defendant for the purpose of attempting to elicit incriminating statements, as opposed to acting as a “mere listening post,” is violating the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. (Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 458-459 [91 L.Ed.2nd 364], analyzing the rule of Henry.)

The Court in Henry found significant three factors in determining whether the government had “deliberately elicited” statements from the accused:

- The informant was acting under instructions from the government and was paid for his actions;
- The informant was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate, causing the defendant to trust him and thus be more likely to make incriminating statements; and
- The defendant was in custody and under indictment. (Ibid.)

The Court also in Henry noted that the defendant’s status as a jail inmate made him “particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents, . . . (who appeared to be) sharing a common plight,” (Id., at p. 274 [65 L.Ed.2nd at p. 124].) differentiating an in-custody situation from the situation when the defendant is not in-custody, and not yet charged, as described in Hoffa v. United States (1966) 385 U.S. 392 [17 L.Ed.2nd 374]. (Id., at p. 272.)

Similarly, a co-principle, working at the request of the police and who purposely “stimulates” conversation with the defendant about the charged offenses, even when the defendant knew the co-principle was supplying information to the police, is a Sixth Amendment Massiah violation. (In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 909-920.)

But see Bey v. Morton (3rd Cir. 1997) 124 F.3rd 524, where a corrections officer, assigned to watch death row inmates, engaged defendant, whose appeal was pending, in various conversations about the details of two homicides during which defendant confessed to both. After reversal of defendant’s conviction, the officer was allowed to testify as to defendant’s statements over a Sixth Amendment objection. Reason: The officer, “while a state actor, was not
a state actor deliberately engaged in trying to secure information from the defendant for use in connection with the prosecution that was the subject matter of counsel’s representation.”

Note, however, footnote 7, Id., at p. 531, where the Court notes that the result might be different under circumstances where inculpatory statements should be foreseen.

A prosecutor (and, inferably, a police officer) doing anything to facilitate an informant’s visit with a charged defendant, to obtain the defendant’s statements, will raise Sixth Amendment issues, even when it is the informant’s idea. (Franklin v. Duncan (9th Cir. 1995) 70 F.3rd 75, adopting factual and legal conclusions of the trial court’s decision at 884 F.Supp. 1435.)

Purposely returning a jail inmate to the defendant’s cell, knowing that the inmate is desirous of obtaining a favorable plea bargain in exchange for obtaining incriminating statements from a cellmate (i.e., the defendant), makes the inmate a state agent. Whether or not, however, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated depends upon what the inmate does to obtain such incriminating statements. (Randolph v. California (9th Cir. 2004) 380 F.3rd 1133.)

Putting a potential co-suspect into a charged defendant’s jail cell to see what the two of them will talk about, at least where the co-suspect knows nothing about the investigator’s plan, is not a Sixth Amendment violation. (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472.)

Without Questioning: Using an undercover agent or informant who merely acts as a “listening post,” without encouraging the defendant to talk about his offense, is not a Massiah violation. (People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3rd 543, 559-561; United States v. Birbal (2nd Cir. 1997) 113 F.3rd 342, 345-346.)

The Sixth Amendment is not violated when an informant does nothing to encourage the defendant to talk about his case. The Sixth Amendment does not protect a talkative defendant from volunteering incriminating statements. (Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 456-461 [91 L.Ed.2nd 364, 382-385]; see also People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3rd 375, 401.)

Surreptitiously recording a conversation between defendant and a fellow prisoner after defendant had invoked his right to have counsel present during interrogation is not a Massiah violation, even if the prisoner is intentionally placed there to see what they might say, so
long as the prisoner is not a police agent. *(People v. Lucero* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3rd 1065, 1067-1069.)

*But:* “The right to counsel may also be violated when a cooperating defendant participates with noncooperating defendants and their attorneys in joint strategy sessions.” *(United States v. Miller* (2nd Cir. 1997) 116 F.3rd 641, 665.)

*Exception:* “Where the presence of the government’s agent or informant at the defense conference is either unintentional or justified by the necessity of protecting the informant’s identity, there can be no violation of the **Sixth Amendment** without some communication of valuable information derived from the intrusion to the government . . .” *(United States v. Ginsberg* (2nd Cir. 1985) 758 F.2nd 823, 833.)

In such an instance, a **Massiah** claim will fail unless it is shown that the government benefited from the cooperating defendant’s attendance. *(United States v. Miller, supra.)*

**Non-Law Enforcement Acting on their Own:**

Another inmate acting on his own, without encouragement from law enforcement, questioning a suspect, is not a **Sixth Amendment** violation even though he takes his information to the police after the fact. *(People v. Valasquez* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3rd 319, 329; *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 203-205.)

The defendant has the burden of “demonstrat(ing) that . . . the informant (1) was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited incriminating statements.” *(In re Neely* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 915.)

“If an informant ‘acts on his own initiative,’ even if he interrogates the accused, ‘the government may not be said to have deliberately elicited the statements.’ [Citation]” *(People v. Fairbank* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1247.)

An informant who has agreed to provide the government with “any and all information in his possession relating directly or indirectly to any and all criminal activities or other matters of which he has knowledge” is not a government agent for purposes of obtaining what he can elicit from a particular defendant not specifically contemplated when the agreement was made. *(United States v.}
**Birbal** (2nd Cir. 1997) 113 F.3rd 342, 345-346: “The Sixth Amendment rights of a talkative inmate are not violated when a jailmate acts in an entrepreneurial way to seek information of potential value, without having been deputized by the government to question that defendant.”

But, an agreement between the police and an informant need not be explicit, “but may be inferred from the circumstances through evidence that the parties behaved as though there were an agreement between them, following a particular course of conduct over a period of time. [Citation]” (In re *Neely*, supra.)

*But see also People v. Fairbank, supra*, at pp. 1247-1249; contacts with law enforcement where nothing was done to encourage the informant to talk to defendant did not establish even an implicit agreement.

Defendant’s phone calls to his wife from jail, recorded by the wife at the suggestion of law enforcement, does not violate *Massiah*, at least where the wife did not actively attempt to elicit incriminating responses. (*People v. Wojtokowski* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3rd 1077, 1081.)

Information volunteered by defendant to another inmate was admissible. The fact that the officers then sent the informant back telling him to “remember anything further (defendant) might tell (him), with no promises of reward, was held not to be a violation of *Massiah* or *Henry*. (*Brooks v. Kincheloe* (9th Cir. 1988) 848 F.2nd 940.)

Defendant’s girlfriend, who was supplied a tape recorder by law enforcement with which to record telephone conversations with defendant concerning threats he made to her and her children, even without instructions to avoid discussions about the murder prosecution that was already underway, resulting in the girlfriend, on her own initiative, interrogating defendant about the charged murder, was not a Sixth Amendment violation given the lack of law enforcement encouragement to do what she did. (*People v. Martin* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 408.)

*And*, just knowing that an inmate has been used as an informant in the past, putting her into a cell with the defendant without any instructions or stated intentions for her to collect information from the defendant, does not necessarily result in a *Massiah* violation. The informant, collecting incriminating statements on her own, may

A jailhouse informant providing unsolicited information (i.e., incriminating notes written by defendant) to law enforcement is not a Massiah violation.  *Fairbank v. Ayers* (9th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3d 612, 622-623, as amended at 650 F.3d 1243.)

**Uncharged Crimes:** Questioning a defendant, accomplished through an undercover police agent, concerning crimes for which defendant had not yet been charged, is *not a Sixth Amendment* violation.  *Hoffa v. United States* (1966) 385 U.S. 293 [17 L.Ed.2nd 374].

Being represented by counsel on one case does not preclude using an undercover government agent to elicit incriminating statements relating to some new, uncharged crime. However, the resulting statements are inadmissible in the trial for the already-pending charges.  (*In re Wilson* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 954; government agent posing as a “hit man” being solicited by defendant to murder a witness to the pending charges.)

**Massiah - Error Statements Used as Substantive Evidence:** The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a *Miranda* advisal and waiver is sufficient to purge the taint of a prior Sixth Amendment, Massiah rule violation (i.e., where a charged criminal defendant is surreptitiously questioned while out of custody), thus making the post-Miranda statements admissible as substantive evidence of guilt.  (See *Fellers v. United States* (2004) 540 U.S. 519, 525 [157 L.Ed.2nd 1016]; issue remanded to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal for consideration of this issue.)

**Massiah Error Statements Used for Impeachment:** There is a split of authority on the propriety of using defendant's statements taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment (i.e., Massiah) rights, even when otherwise voluntary, for purposes of impeachment:


**Jackson - Error Statements Admissible for Purposes of Impeachment:** The United States Supreme Court has determined that statements obtained in violation of the “Jackson rule,” (i.e., law enforcement-initiated questioning of an in-custody defendant after criminal proceedings have commenced; see above), at least when the
defendant has provided a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, are admissible for impeachment purposes.  (*Michigan v. Harvey* (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350-353 [108 L.Ed.2nd 293, 302-304].)

However, the Court specifically reserved for future determination the issue of whether or not a knowing and voluntary waiver is in fact a necessary prerequisite to using a defendant’s statements against him for impeachment purposes.  (*Id.,* at p. 354 [108 L.Ed.2nd at p. 305].)

**Relevance at Trial:** A prosecutor’s reference at trial to a defendant having retained and consulted with an attorney, where relevant to impeachment, or when the defense has “opened the door,” is not improper.  (*United States v. Ross* (9th Cir. 1977) 123 F.3rd 1181, 1187; see also *Geders v. United States* (1976) 425 U.S. 80, 89-90 [47 L.Ed.2nd 592, 600]; asking whether defendant reviewed testimony with a lawyer (i.e., was “coached”) is proper impeachment.


Although there is a split of authority, the majority rule seems to be that a defendant is not required to have testified in order to preserve this issue for appeal.  (*United States v. Chischilly* (9th Cir. 1994) 30 F.3rd 1144, 1150-1151; *People v. Brown*, *supra*, at pp. 468-471.)

**Right to Competent Counsel:**

The *Sixth Amendment* right to counsel requires that defendant’s counsel be competent.  It is the defendant’s burden to show that his attorney failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonable competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates.  (*People v. Pope* (1979) 23 Cal.3rd 412, 425.)

When the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on an act or omission not amounting to withdrawal of a defense, he must prove that his counsel failed to perform with reasonable competence and that it is reasonably probable a determination more favorable to the defendant would have resulted in the absence of his counsel’s failings.  (*People v. Fosselman* (1983) 33 Cal.3rd 572, 584.)

“In order to prevail, the defendant must sow both that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [Citation], and that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  [Citation]” (*Kimmelman v. Morrison* (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 375 [91 L.Ed.2nd 305].)
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must establish both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 [80 L. Ed. 2nd 674].)

“Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (Id, at p. 689.)

The test for prejudice in a capital case is “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” (Id, at p. 695.)

Examples:

The court held that defendant failed to meet his burden of showing he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged failure to present at the penalty phase of a capital case mitigating evidence of childhood sexual abuse by his mother because he had not shown that further investigation by counsel would have revealed evidence of the abuse. Petitioner never told his trial counsel of being sexually abused by his mother, and his first and only mention of such abuse occurred 17 years after his arrest for the murder of his wife. Petitioner was also not prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged failure to present at the penalty phase mitigating evidence of his family history. The mitigating evidence petitioner presented at the reference hearing of his dysfunctional family might have elicited some jury sympathy for him at the penalty phase, but he showed no causal connection between his family environment and his cold-blooded and calculated decision to brutally murder his wife a few months after they were married, for the sole purpose of obtaining her money and possessions. There was no reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's alleged failings, the result of the penalty phase would have been different. (In re Crew (2011) 52 Cal.4th 126.)

Defendant’s argument that his lawyer should have had an expert testify that the surviving victim was using a .380 caliber Mac-12 handgun whose modifications made it prone to jamming was rejected by the Court. Specifically, defendant contended that the state court’s rejection of this ineffective assistance of counsel
argument was an “unreasonable application” of Strickland v. Washington. Because the state court could reasonably have come to the same conclusion as the three judge panel—which found no reasonable probability that the jury would have changed its verdict had they heard additional testimony stating that the Mac-12 could possibly malfunction in some manner—its rejection of defendant’s argument was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. (Richter v. Harrington (9th Cir. 2011) 643 F.3rd 1238.)

Overruling prior precedent, the California Supreme Court determined in People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, that a defendant’s post-plea admission to a probation officer regarding a prior criminal action is not part of that action’s “record of conviction,” and that the statement cannot be admitted to establish that the prior conviction qualified as a strike. Defendant complained that such an admission in his post-plea probation report, made prior to the Supreme Court’s decision on this issue, were used against him, qualifying his current conviction as a strike. In a writ of habeas corpus, defendant challenged the competency of his attorney for not having raised this issue. The Court here, however, held that it was not incompetence of counsel not to have predicted this change in the law. (In re Richardson (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 647, 657-660.)

The federal district court did not err in rejecting the defendant’s claim that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his brain damage, mental illness, substance abuse, childhood abuse and neglect, and redeeming characteristics. Defense counsel provided the defense expert with the information necessary to form an expert opinion, the expert investigated the potential defense, and defense counsel made a strategic decision to not place the prisoner’s mental state in play to avoid the introduction of aggravating evidence. The defendant’s ineffective assistance claim that stemmed from trial counsel’s presentation of allegedly aggravating and prejudicial evidence failed because the defense expert’s testimony was generally favorable to the prisoner, and any negative inferences were based on a trial strategy of gaining credibility with the jury. (Fairbank v. Ayers (9th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3rd 612, 617-622, as amended at 650 F.3rd 1243.)

**Relationship to the Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel:**

**Fifth Amendment Right to an Attorney:** Applies, typically, to that time period between (1) the taking of the suspect into custody and (2) the initiation of criminal proceedings.
Although not specifically mentioned in the **Fifth Amendment**, a criminal suspect’s right to the assistance of an attorney during a custodial interrogation prior to the filing of an accusatory pleading can be inferred due to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 445 [16 L.Ed.2nd 694, 708].

**Arraignment and the Fifth Amendment**: Requesting an attorney at an arraignment, line-up or bail review, has been held to be an invocation of the offense-specific **Sixth Amendment** right to counsel, but not the non-offense-specific **Fifth Amendment** implied right to counsel. *(McNeil v. Wisconsin* (1991) 501 U.S 171, 178-179 [115 L.Ed.2nd 158, 169]; *People v. Lispier* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1324-1326; *United States v. McKinley* (7th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3rd 904; *United States v. Doherty* (6th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3rd 769, 774-775; *United States v. Melgar* (4th Cir. 1998) 139 F.3rd 1005, 1011.)*

However, ignoring one’s **Fifth Amendment**, *Miranda* rights does not become an actual **Fifth Amendment** violation, triggering sanctions, until some use of the defendant’s resulting statements is made during the prosecution phase of the criminal case. *(Chavez v. Martinez* (2003) 538 U.S. 760 [155 L.Ed.2nd 984].)

The current debate is whether the point in time where sanctions are appropriate is when the resulting statements are actually used at the criminal trial itself, or at some point in the prosecution before trial; e.g., when it has been relied upon to file formal charges against the declarant, to determine judicially that the prosecution may proceed, and/or to determine pretrial custody status. The Ninth Circuit is of the opinion that the earlier stages are when the **Fifth Amendment** requires sanctions to be imposed. *(Stoot v. City of Everett* (9th Cir. 2009) 582 F.3rd 910, 922-925.)*

**Legal Implications**: If, after a *Miranda* admonishment, a suspect invokes his **Fifth Amendment** “right to counsel” (as opposed to his **Fifth Amendment** “right against self-incrimination”), the officer must cease questioning (See *Taylor v. Maddox* (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3rd 992.) and may never (absent a lawful exception) come back and question him or her again about *that case or any other case* as long as he or she remains in custody. *(Edwards v. Arizona, (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [68 L.Ed.2d 378]; sometimes called the “Edwards Rule.”)*

This is true even if the officer conducting the second interrogation is *unaware* of the prior invocation of the subject’s rights. *(Arizona v. Roberson* (1988) 486 U.S. 675, 687 [100 L.Ed.2nd 704, 717].)*
This is also true even though before the officer’s return, the in-custody defendant has had the opportunity to, or did in fact consult with an attorney. *(Minnick v. Mississippi* (1990) 498 U.S. 146 [112 L.Ed.2nd 489].)

“*Edwards v. Arizona* added a second layer of protection to the *Miranda* rules, holding that ‘when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.  [Citation]’” *(Michigan v. Harvey* (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350 [108 L.Ed.2nd 293, 302].)

**Necessity for a clear, unambiguous, invocation:**

The **Fifth Amendment** right to counsel can only be invoked by a clear, express, and unambiguous request for an attorney. Any ambiguous attempts to ask for an attorney will be held to be legally ineffective. *(Davis v. United States* (1994) 512 U.S. 452 [129 L.Ed.2nd 362].)

“During an interrogation, moreover, an officer has no obligation to clarify the ambiguous statement by the accused.” *(United States v. Muhammad* (7th Cir. 1997) 120 F.3rd 688, 698; citing *Davis v. United States*, *supra*, at p. 461 [129 L.Ed.2nd at p. 372].)

*Compare:* Any ambiguity in an invocation of the “*right to remain silent*” may be decided in the defendant’s favor *(People v. Green* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 685, 693.), although recent authority seems to hint that such an invocation must also be unambiguous in order to be legally effective. *(See People v. Stitely* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 534-536; and *Arnold v. Runnels* (9th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3rd 859, 870.)

“Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” *(Davis v. United States, *supra*.)

**Examples:**

*Davis v. United States*, *supra*, at p. 459 [129 L.Ed2nd at p. 371]; The defendant’s statement that; “*Maybe I should talk to a lawyer*,” was held to be ambiguous as an invocation and subject to clarification.

See also *People v. Crittenden* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 129, for a summary of pre-**Proposition 8** California cases where equivocal comments concerning the need for an attorney were held to be
effective invocations. However, the Supreme Court recognized in *Crittenden* that California now abides by the federal rule as announced in *Davis*. (Id., at pp. 129-131; “Did you say I could have a lawyer?” held not to be an effective invocation.)

“I just thinkin’, maybe I shouldn’t say anything without a lawyer and then I thinkin’ ahh.” No invocation. Defendant did not clearly and unambiguously request an attorney. (*People v. Bestelmeyer* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 528.)

“Do you think I need a lawyer?” No invocation. (*Diaz v. Senkowski* (2nd Cir. 1996) 76 F.3d 61, 63.)

“I think I need a lawyer.” No invocation. (*Burket v. Angelone* (4th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 172, 198.)

“I don’t know if I should without a lawyer,” together with defendant’s later comment, “Okay, that one,” held not to be an invocation when taking into consideration the circumstances (i.e., defendant’s later comment about “that one” held to be referring to a particular question, and not one of his enumerated rights) and his later actions. (*People v. Michaels* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 510.)

*Clark v. Murphy* (9th Cir. 2003) 317 F.3rd 1038: Defendant’s statement; “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer,” held to be equivocal, and ineffective as an invocation. Also, his later statement; “Should I be telling you or should I talk to a lawyer” was found to not even be close.

*People v. Sapp* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 264-269: “Maybe I should have an attorney;” Too ambiguous, even though as to pre-Proposition 8 offenses (June 8, 1982), such a comment is legally effective, it is clearly not sufficient for any offenses occurring after that date.

Announcing, while being arrested, that she intended to call her lawyer was held not to be a clear and unequivocal invocation in *People v. Nguyen* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 350, 357-358.


*Test:* Whether or not a defendant’s comments are an invocation depends upon how a “reasonable officer” would have understood what he said, under the circumstances. (*People v. Gonzalez*, supra, at pp. 1123-1124;
citing Davis v. United States, supra. See also People v. McMahon, supra, at p. 96.)

Issue: Need for a prior waiver?: In Davis v. United States, supra, the defendant had waived his Miranda rights and answered questions for a period of time before un successfully attempting to invoke this right to an attorney.

Some of the language in People v. Gonzalez, supra, where the defendant had also waived his rights and answered some questions before raising the issue of his right to an attorney, could be interpreted as requiring a prior waiver before the rule of Davis is applicable.

The California Supreme Court in People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 534-536 (a “right to silence” case), although not discussing the issue, infers strongly that there is in fact a requirement for a prior waiver before an equivocal attempt at an invocation will be held to be legally insufficient.

In People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, the California Supreme Court makes it very clear that the rule that an invocation of either the defendant’s right to remain silent or to the assistance of counsel must be clear and unequivocal to be legally effective applies only after a prior waiver and an alleged attempt to invoke mid-interrogation.

Compare: A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel automatically kicks in upon the initiation of criminal proceedings. (See above.)

A Fifth Amendment right to counsel is said to be “non-offense-specific.”

This means that it attaches to any and all crimes, whether or not charged, so long as he or she remains in custody. (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171 [115 L.Ed.2nd 158]; Arizona v. Roberson, supra.)

Query #1: Is an in-custody defendant therefore perpetually immune from questioning for any new offenses committed while still in custody? Probably not:

Answers to questions during an investigation of an in-custody defendant’s plan to kill a witness were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment (Massiah) rights as far as the pending case was concerned, but were held to be admissible in the separate prosecution.
of any, as of yet uncharged, new case.  (*Maine v. Moulton* (1985) 474 U.S. 159 [88 L.Ed.2nd 481].)

An in-custody defendant's statements to an undercover officer posing as a “hit man” about eliminating a witness were held to be inadmissible in the trial of the then pending charges only.  (*In re Wilson* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 951-955; discussing the *Massiah* issue; and see *Massiah v. United States* (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [12 L.Ed.2nd 246]; see below.)

*Query #2*:  Is an in-custody defendant also therefore perpetually immune from questioning about all prior offenses committed before having been taken into custody, when defendant is serving an extended term?  For instance, is law enforcement precluded from questioning a “lifer” about a 10 or 15-year-old homicide?  *Probably not:*

See *United States v. Green* (D.C. App. 1991) 592 A.2nd 985, cert. granted, (1992) 504 U.S. 908; (1993) 507 U.S. 545 [123 L.Ed.2nd 260]; vacating order granting cert. Arguments heard, 52 Crim. L. Rev. (BNA) 3096-97 (Nov. 30, 1992); where the lower appellate court found that interviewing an in-custody juvenile about a separate, uncharged offense, five months after he invoked his right to an attorney on the prior, charged case, but *before* being sentenced, was a violation of the *Edwards* rule.  (The appeal was never resolved by the Supreme Court because the defendant was murdered before a decision could be reached.)

*But also see Clark v. State* (2001) 140 Md.App. 540, 584-600, in a detailed analysis of the issue, holding that after a defendant is convicted and sentenced, the inherent pressures of incarceration dissipate to the extent that the purposes behind the *Edwards* rule are no longer applicable.  Questioning on a prior, uncharged case, therefore, should be permissible.

The United States Supreme Court recently solved this dilemma in *Maryland v. Shatzer* (Feb. 24, 2010) 559 U.S. __ [130 S.Ct. 1213; 175 L.Ed.2nd 1045], where it was held that after a *Miranda* invocation of a suspect’s right to counsel, the interrogation may be reinitiated following a 14-day break in custody.  The defendant in this case was a prison inmate, serving time on a prior conviction.  Recognizing the uniqueness of this type of situation, the Court further held that retuning the defendant to the general prison population is such a break in custody.
Compare: One’s Sixth Amendment “right to Counsel” is “offense-Specific,” meaning that it protects the defendant from being questioned only about offenses already charged. (See above)

Where the suspect fails to specify which right (“right to counsel” vs. “right to remain silent”) following a Miranda advisal, he or she will be held to be invoking a right to silence only. (People v. Lisper (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1322; see also People v. DeLeon (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1269-1272.)

**Attorney's Attempts to Invoke Client's Fifth or Sixth Amendment Rights prior to Arraignment:**

Note that the Sixth Amendment does not attach until the defendant has been charged in court (i.e., formal charge, indictment, information, arraignment, or the suspect's first appearance in court; see Michigan v. Jackson (1986) 475 U.S. 625, 633 [89 L.Ed.2nd 631, 640].), and therefore does not prevent police from questioning a suspect until that point, even when the attorney calls police beforehand and commands them not to question his or her client. (See People v. Stephens (1990) 218 Cal.App.3rd 575, 585.)

The Sixth Amendment right is not applicable until defendant has been charged in court (i.e., arraigned). (United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 187-188 [81 L.Ed.2nd 146, 153-154].)

“(T)he suggestion that the existence of an attorney-client relationship itself triggers the protections of the Sixth Amendment misconceives the underlying purposes of the right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment’s intended function is not to wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client relationship for its own sake any more that it is to protect a suspect from the consequences of his own candor.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 430 [89 L.Ed.2nd 410, 427]; United States v. Harrison (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3rd 1206, 1212-1213.)

Attempts by defense counsel to invoke a criminal defendant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights merely by filing a document in court purporting to do so are legally ineffective. (United States v. Grimes (11th Cir. 1998) 142 F.3rd 1342, 1347-1348; Alston v. Redman (3rd Cir. 1994) 34 F.3rd 1237; United States v. Thompson (2nd Cir. 1994) 35 F.3rd 100; People v. Avila (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 416; People v. Beltran (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 425.)

This means that any attempts by an attorney to insulate his client from questioning during a police investigation, prior to indictment, by “warning” the police not to talk to his client has no legal effect. (Moran v. Burbine, supra.)
But see *United States v. Harrison* (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3rd 1206; a case where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal determined that an uncharged criminal suspect’s **Sixth Amendment** rights were violated when defendant had retained counsel, the government knew that he had counsel for purposes of the pending investigation, and an eventual indictment brought charges precisely anticipated by the scope of the pre-indictment investigation. A questionable decision in light of other case law.

Also, an attorney’s attempt to invoke his or her clients’ **Fifth Amendment** rights does not shield the defendant:

*Only the defendant* may invoke the protections of the **Fifth Amendment**, and then only at the time questioning is attempted. (*McNeil v. Wisconsin* (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 182, fn. 3 [115 L.Ed.2nd 158, 171]; *United States v. Wright* (9th Cir. 1992) 962 F.2nd 953, 955; *People v. Calderon* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 766.)

His or her attorney cannot do it for him. (*Moran v. Burbine*, supra.)

Events occurring outside the presence of a suspect, such as an attempt by the suspect’s attorney to contact him, and entirely unknown to him, can have no bearing on the suspect’s capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. (*Moran v. Burbine*, supra, at p. 422 [89 L.Ed.2nd at p. 421].)

California’s prior contrary rule, under *People v. Houston* (1986) 42 Cal.3rd 595, was abrogated by **Proposition 8**. (*People v. Ledesma* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3rd 682, 689.)

Note, however, that if the defendant in such a circumstance has been formally charged in court, such as by the filing of an indictment, then ignoring an attorney’s attempt to make contact with his client while an interrogation is proceeding would be a **Sixth Amendment** violation. (*Patterson v. Illinois* (1988) 487 U.S. 285, 296 [101 L.Ed.2nd 261].)

There is no requirement that the police notify defendant’s retained attorney before beginning any questioning that is constitutionally allowable. (*People v. Duck Wong* (1976) 18 Cal.3rd 178, 187; *People v. Sultana* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3rd 511, 521.)

**Right to Confrontation:**

The right to confront one’s accusers, as guaranteed by the **Sixth Amendment**, is an element of federal “due process.” (*Snyder v. Massachusetts* (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 106 [78 L.Ed. 674, 678]; *Pointer v. Texas* (1965) 380 U.S. 400 [13 L.Ed.2nd
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

The Sixth Amendment, as an element of “due process,” applies equally to the states. (Pointer v. Texas, supra.)


See also P.C. 686: “In a criminal action the defendant is entitled: . . . subd. 3 . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him, in the presence of the court . . . (with listed exceptions).”

In Pointer, a robbery victim testified against defendant (who was not represented by counsel) and another codefendant at a preliminary examination. Defendant did not cross-examine the victim. At trial, the victim was out of state, so the preliminary examination transcript of the victim’s testimony was used over defendant’s objection. This was held to be a Sixth Amendment confrontation violation. The Court noted, however, that had defendant had an attorney who had an opportunity to cross-examine the victim, the result would have been different.

The confrontation right includes the right to a face-to-face confrontation. “The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is so much truth in it. . . . That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child, but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.” (Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 [101 L.Ed.2nd 857, 865].)

See Winzer v. Hall (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3rd 1192, 1196-1198, for a discussion of the history behind the implementation of the “confrontation clause.”

In Winzer, use of California’s “spontaneous declaration” (E.C. § 1240) exception to the hearsay rule held to be improper where there was no evidence that the victim’s declaration was in fact “spontaneous.”

Allowing a child molest victim to testify from behind a screen, blocking the defendant’s view of the victim, was error. (Coy v. Iowa, supra.)
Devising a seating arrangement whereby the defendant was able to hear, but not see, the five-year-old victim held to be a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. *(Herbert v. Superior Court* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3rd 661, 671.)

Use of a one-way glass during an adult victim’s testimony, shielding the victim from the defendant so that she could not see the defendant during her testimony, was a Sixth Amendment violation. The trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing or make any determinations that such a procedure was necessary under the circumstances. *(People v. Murphy* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 11150.)

However, “this right is not absolute.” *(People v. Seijas* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 303; *Michigan v. Bryant* (2011) __ U.S. __ [111 S.Ct. 1143; 179 L.Ed.2nd 93].)

Recognizing that there are exceptions, the Supreme Court allowed a child abuse victim to testify from a separate room in the presence of both counsel and a one-way closed circuit television so that the defendant (who had communication with his attorney), judge and jury, all in the courtroom, could see the victim as he testified. This was after the judge made a finding that requiring the child to testify in the courtroom “will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.” *(Maryland v. Craig* (1990) 497 U.S. 836 [111 L.Ed.2nd 666].)

The confrontation right does not bar admission of statements of an unavailable witness if the statements “bear adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’” We held that reliability can be established if “the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or if it does not fall within such an exception, then if it bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” *Michigan v. Bryant*, supra, at p. __, citing *Ohio v. Roberts* (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2nd 597].

Per the Supreme Court, the right to confrontation may be satisfied without face-to-face confrontation *only* where:

- The denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy; *and*
- The reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.

*(Maryland v. Craig*, supra, at p. 837 [111 L.Ed.2nd at p. 682].)

Both requirements are met where the purpose is to protect child witnesses from the trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases and all the other
elements of the confrontation right (i.e., competency of the witness, testimony under oath, contemporaneous cross-examination, and observation of the child’s demeanor by the defendant and the trier of fact) are present.  (*Ibid.*)

See also *People v. Williams* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 995, 1006, where it was held that the trial judge *did not err* in admitting a videotape recording of an adult victim on the ground that she suffered from physical and mental disabilities and would be traumatized by having to face defendant.

Defendant’s confrontation rights at a probation revocation hearing outweighed by the prosecutor’s good faith attempt to produce the victim to prove a domestic violence allegation, where there were corroborative facts tending to establish the reliability of the victim’s report to law enforcement. The officer’s hearsay testimony was properly admitted. (*United States v. Hall* (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3rd 980.)

However, hearsay testimony at a probation revocation hearing is inadmissible where the declarant is readily available and no good cause is shown. (*People v. Shepherd* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193.)

The use of hearsay at a preliminary examination violates neither the defendant’s *Sixth Amendment* right to confrontation nor his *Fourteenth Amendment* right to due process. (*Peterson v. State of California* (9th Cir. 2010) 604 F.3rd 1166, 1169-1171.)


See also:

**P.C. § 1346**: Use at trial of a videotape recording of the preliminary examination testimony of a victim of physical or sexual assault/abuse, such victim being 15 years of age or less, or developmentally disabled as a result of mentally retardation, upon a finding by the trial court that further testimony would cause the victim emotional trauma so that the victim is medically or otherwise unavailable, per E.C. § 240.

**P.C. § 1346.1**: Use at trial of the videotaped preliminary examination testimony of a spousal rape or spousal battery victim when otherwise legally admissible.
P.C. § 1347: Use at trial or preliminary examination of the two-way closed circuit TV testimony, out of the presence of the judge, jury, defendant and attorneys, of a child sexual assault or violent felony victim, or victim of child endangerment (per P.C. § 273a) or child abuse (per P.C. § 273d) when the victim is 13 years of age or younger and other statutory requirements are met.

P.C. § 1347.5: Use of close circuit TV to communicate the testimony of a disabled physical or sexual assault victim.

As to the various exceptions to the “Hearsay Rule” that have Sixth Amendment confrontation implications, see “Hearsay,” below: E.g.:

- E.C. § 1228: Sex abuse child’s statements admissible for foundational purposes.
- E.C. § 1230: Declaration against interest.
- E.C. § 1223: Admission of a co-conspirator.
- E.C. § 1231: Statement of deceased declarant in gang cases.
- E.C. § 1238: Prior Identification (e.g., at a curbstone lineup.)
- E.C. § 1240: Spontaneous statements.
- E.C. § 1241: Contemporaneous statements.
- E.C. § 1242: Dying declaration.
- E.C. § 1250: Statement of declarant’s then existing mental or physical state.
- E.C. § 1251: Statement of declarant’s previously existing mental or physical state.
- E.C. § 1253: Child neglect or abuse victim’s statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
- E.C. § 1370: Victim’s report of physical injury.


Confrontation Clause issues are reviewed by appellate courts de novo. (United States v. Nielsen (9th Cir. 2004) 371 F.3rd 574, 581.)

“Effective cross-examination is critical to a fair trial because ‘[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.’” (United States v. Larson, supra., citing Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318 [39 L.Ed.2nd 347].)
In Larson, it was held that while it is not error to prohibit opposing counsel from cross-examining a witness about the potential maximum sentence he might face in the absence of leniency being offered by the government for his cooperation in testifying against the defendant, it is error to prevent counsel from asking about the potential minimum sentence he would have been exposed to absent that cooperation. (Id., at pp. 1102-1107.)

“(A) criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed . . . ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” (Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department (9th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3rd 1027, 1035; quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 [89 L.Ed.2nd 674].)

The Confrontation Clause may be violated by excluding testimony of other witnesses relevant to the veracity of a victim’s statements regarding the allegations made against the defendant. (Holly v. Yarborough (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 1091.)

“(T)he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose [testimonial] infirmities [such as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the fact finder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony.” (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318 [39 L.Ed.2nd 347]; Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, supra, at pp. 1036-1037.)

Cross-examination of the detective who interviewed the missing witness is insufficient to meet this standard. (Ocampo v. Vail (2011) 649 F.3rd 1098, 1113.)

The Ninth Circuit uses three factors in evaluating an alleged right-to-effective-cross-examine issue:

- Whether the excluded evidence was relevant;
- Whether there were other legitimate interests outweighing the defendant's interest in presenting the evidence; and
- Whether the exclusion of evidence left the jury with sufficient information to assess the credibility of the witness.

(United States v. Ganoe (9th Cir. 2008) 538 F.3rd 1117, 1125; excluding cross-examination related to the credibility of a witness likely error, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances.)
**Hearsay:** The rules on the use of “hearsay” (i.e., an extra-judicial statement made to a witness who now proposes to testify in court to the statement as he heard it, when offered in evidence to prove the truth of that statement; E.C. § 1200) were recently changed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Crawford v. Washington* (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2nd 177].

Prior to *Crawford*, it had been held that the “Confrontation Clause” of the Sixth Amendment was not automatically violated just because a witness was permitted to testify to someone else’s out-of-court statements; i.e., “hearsay.” Testimony relating to such a statement might still be admissible whenever such a statement “bears ‘adequate indicia of reliability.’” To meet this test, the evidence must either fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or otherwise bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (See *Ohio v. Roberts* (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [65 L.Ed.2nd 597, 608]; see also *People v. Cervantes* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 172; *Michigan v. Bryant* (2011) __ U.S. __, __ [131 S.Ct. 1143; 179 L.Ed.2nd 93].)

*Crawford* announced a new rule: A declarant’s statements to police (or others) are inadmissible at trial, despite an applicable exception to the hearsay rule, unless it is proved that the declarant is (1) now unavailable and (2) the defendant has had a prior opportunity to confront and cross-examine the declarant.

This rule, however, only applies to “testimonial” statements: “(W)here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is confrontation.” (*Crawford v. Washington*, supra, at p. 36.)

The problem is defining “testimonial:”

Without specifically defining the term, the *Crawford* Court held that “testimonial” includes (but is not necessarily limited to) prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, grand jury hearing, or trial. It also includes statements made during police interrogations. (*Crawford v. Washington*, supra, at pp. 51-52.)

“Testimonial” may also include statements contained in affidavits and depositions, depending upon which of the various legal definitions of “testimonial” is used. (*Ibid.*)

In general, “testimonial” statements would include any “pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” (*Ibid.*)
Crawford identified three proposed alternate “formulations” for identifying a testimonial statement:

- Ex parte in-court testimony or its equivalent; i.e., material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.

- Extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavit, deposition, prior testimony, or confessions.

- Statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.


“...Crawford supports a conclusion that the test for determining whether a statement is ‘testimonial’ is not whether its use in a potential trial is foreseeable, but whether it was obtained for the purpose of potentially using it in a criminal trial or determining if a criminal charge should issue.”


The Supreme Court later expanded upon the above third category of testimonial statements in the context of a 9-1-1 call to police for assistance in Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [165 L.Ed.2nd 224] (and Hammon v. Indiana), where two distinctly different cases were analyzed:

- A recording of a domestic violence victim’s 9-1-1 telephone call, requesting help in an on-going situation, was found to be non-testimonial, where the following circumstances existed:
• The victim was speaking of events as they were actually happening.

• The victim was facing an on-going emergency.

• The statements elicited from the victim were necessary to enable the police to resolve the present emergency rather than simple to learn what had happened in the past.

• The formality of the situation was less than where a victim is interviewed about a past event.

• The statements of a domestic violence victim from an interview obtained by police officers responding to a 9-1-1 call for assistance, about an event that although recent, was over, with the victim and suspect separated, were held to be testimonial because:

  • The interview of the victim was part of an investigation into possibly past criminal conduct.

  • There was no emergency in progress.

  • The interview was to determine not what was happening, but rather what had happened.

  • The primary, if not sole, purpose of the interview was to investigate a possible crime.

Even though both the scenarios involved in the Davis case were domestic violence related, it has been noted that non-testimonial statements are not restricted to such cases. (See Michigan v. Bryant (2011) __ U.S. __, __ [131 S.Ct. 1143; 179 L.Ed.2nd 93].)

Davis v. Washington further provided the following summary of the difference between “testimonial” and “non-testimonial” statements:
“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”

“They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”

(Italics added; Id., at p. 822; where the Court also notes that the term “interrogation” is not to be taken literally (fn. 1). It would include what might more often be referred to as a “witness interview.”)


It is also noted in Davis v. Washington, supra, at p. 828, that what is a non-testimonial statement at the beginning may devolve into a testimonial statement at that point when the emergency is over and the police move onto an effort to obtain information concerning a crime that is no longer occurring.

The rule of Davis was analyzed by the California Supreme Court in People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, at page 984, where it summarized the issue:

“First, . . . the confrontation clause is concerned solely with hearsay statements that are testimonial, in that they are out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial.

Second, though a statement need not be sworn under oath to be testimonial, it must have occurred under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity characteristic of testimony. [fn. omitted.]

Third, the statement must have been given and taken primarily for the purpose ascribed to
testimony—to establish or prove some past fact for possible use in a criminal trial.

Fourth, the primary purpose for which a statement was given and taken is to be determined ‘objectively,’ considering all the circumstances that might reasonably bear on the intent of the participants in the conversation. [fn. omitted.]

Fifth, sufficient formality and solemnity are present when, in a non-emergency situation, one responds to questioning by law enforcement officials, where deliberate falsehoods might be criminal offenses.

Sixth, statements elicited by law enforcement officials are not testimonial if the primary purpose in giving and receiving them is to deal with a contemporaneous emergency, rather than to produce evidence about past events for possible use at a criminal trial.” (see also People v. Osorio (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 603, 612-613; and People v. Byron (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 657, 668.)

The United States Supreme Court further held that when a court must determine whether the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a statement at trial, it should determine the primary purpose of the interrogation by objectively evaluating the statements and actions of the parties to the encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the interrogation occurs. The existence of an emergency or the parties’ perception that an emergency is ongoing is among the most important circumstances that courts must take into account in determining whether an interrogation is testimonial because statements made to assist police in addressing an ongoing emergency presumably lack the testimonial purpose that would subject them to the requirement of confrontation. The existence and duration of an emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public. (Michigan v. Bryant (2011) ___ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 1143, 1162-1163; 179 L.Ed.2nd 93].)

Prior statements that are not testimonial were identified in Crawford as information obtained from “business records” (E.C. § 1270) and statements made in “furtherance of a conspiracy” (E.C. § 1223), and maybe even “dying declarations.” (E.C. § 1242)

See “Dying Declarations,” below.

Also, an “off-hand, overheard remark” does not necessarily involve the Sixth Amendment. Further, it is apparent that statements offered on some other issue than to establish the “truth of the matter asserted” in the statement (e.g., information used by a police officer to establish probable cause, or, arguably, statements used to impeach a witness when he or she testifies and lies) are not “testimonial.” (Crawford v. Washington, supra, at pp. 51-52.)

Hearsay statements that are determined not to be testimonial are tested for admissibility as dictated in Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400 [13 L.Ed.2d 923] and Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [65 L.Ed.2d 597]; (Parle v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 1030, 1037-1042; homicide victim’s diary entries describing prior incidents of domestic abuse inflicted by the defendant held to be admissible non-testimonial hearsay, pursuant to E.C. § 1370 [Infliction of, or threat to inflict, physical injury].)

Examples of “Testimonial” statements that will not be admitted into evidence:

An interview at the scene of a recent domestic violence incident, after the victim and suspect are separated and the victim is interviewed about what had occurred after the fact, for the purpose of investigating a possible crime. (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 [165 L.Ed.2d 224].)

Statements made by a child abuse victim (e.g., four years old) to a police officer and, separately, a professionally trained child interviewer, after the child is ruled to be incompetent to testify due to her age, such statements thus meeting the hearsay rule exception requirements of Evid. Code § 1360 (Statements of a child under the age of 12, describing an act of child abuse), are “testimonial” and thus inadmissible as a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. (People v. Sisavath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1396.)

A police videotaped interview of a “dependent adult” (per P.C. § 368(h)) in an elder and dependent adult financial
abuse case, where the victim dies a few days later.  (*People v. Pirwani* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 770.)

The interviews of a slashing victim conducted by a police officer, both in the hospital emergency room and later at the police station, are clearly *testimonial*, although the victim’s statements to the emergency room doctor, asked for the purpose of determining treatment that was to be given, is not testimonial.  (*People v. Cage* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965; the issue being the admissibility of the victim’s hearsay statements under *E.C. §§ 1240* [spontaneous statements] and 1370 [victim’s report of physical injury].)

A witness’s testimony in front a grand jury is testimonial. Where defendant is precluded from cross-examining the witness at trial on her grand jury testimony, after she had been questioned on it in the Government’s case-in-chief during which she disavowed what she had told the grand jury under oath, and thereafter made herself “unavailable” by invoking her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under *Crawford*. (*United States v. Wilmore* (9th Cir. 2004) 381 F.3rd 868.)

A declaration previously sworn to by a homicide victim in her application for a restraining order is *testimonial*, and not admissible against the defendant in his later murder prosecution.  (*People v. Pantoja* (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1, 9.)

Tape-recorded statements of two witnesses to defendant’s crime were held to be inadmissible hearsay statements, and violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights when admitted into evidence.  (*People v. Lee* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 483, 487-491.)

The statements to a police detective by defendant’s six-year-old step daughter, where the victim was unable to reiterate her prior account to the detective of being molested.  (*Bockting v. Bayer* (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3rd 1010, as amended at 408 F.3rd 1127; the Court finding the rule of *Washington* to be a new rule, that it was retroactive, and that admission of the victim’s hearsay statements were not harmless error.)
Admission into evidence of non-testifying co-defendant’s statement to an investigator implicating the other defendants in a jail assault, where the declarant did not testify and was therefore not subject to cross-examination, violated the rule of Crawford. (People v. Pena et al. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1219.)

The statements by a robbery victim given to one of the initial officers at the scene of the suspect’s arrest after it was already clear that a robbery had occurred. (In re Fernando R. (2005) 137 Cal.App.4th 148.)

An interview of an elder adult by a law enforcement officer after any exigencies have expired, and where most of the interview consisted on questions pertaining to the defendant’s conduct, the victim’s deteriorating opinion of him, and her desire that he not inherit any of her property. (People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731, 745.)

Victim’s statements to a police officer a full week after being assaulted in a domestic violence incident. (People v. Quitiquit (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1, 14; conc. Opinion.)

A forensic report prepared by a laboratory technician is testimonial, and thus inadmissible under Crawford as a Sixth Amendment confrontation issue, requiring the technician himself to testify. (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 [174 L.Ed.2nd 314].)

Petition for review was granted on May 12, 2010, by the California Supreme Court in Benitez, making this case no longer available for citation.

See People v. Vargas (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 647, 659-660, noting the conflict, but declining to decide whether Melendez-Diaz did in fact overrule Geier in that even if error, the evidence was harmless.

Also see People v. Sanchez (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 928, holding that the use in evidence of a certified letter from the California Department of Justice, Firearms Division, attesting to the fact that defendant was not listed as the registered owner of a firearm found concealed on his person, making the possession of the firearm a felony (P.C. § 12025(b)(6)), was a violation of defendant’s Sixty Amendment right of confrontation.

The California Supreme Court granted review in this case on July 20, 2011, making it unavailable for citation.

Also see People v. Davis (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1254, where it was held that reports prepared by non-testifying physicians are not testimonial out-of-court statements and as such, they are admissible under the Sixth Amendment.

The California Supreme Court granted review in this case on January 11, 2012, making it unavailable for citation.

A sexual assault victim’s statements made to a nurse during a sexual assault examination which was done for the purpose of documenting and collecting evidence, are testimonial and inadmissible. (People v. Vargas (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 647.)

The fact that testimonial statements were introduced by defendant’s co-defendant’s counsel is irrelevant to the issue whether the Sixth Amendment was violated. It is also irrelevant whether the statements directly inculpated defendant. The issue is whether defendant was deprived of
his right to cross-examine the declarant. \textit{(United States v. Nguyen} (9th Cir. 2009) 565 F.3rd 668.)

The affidavit of a Washington Department of Employment Security Assistant Records Officer, prepared for use at defendant’s trial to prove the absence of any record of defendant having legitimate employment, should not have been admitted without the testimony of the affiant. \textit{(United States v. Norwood} (9th Cir. 2010) 603 F.3rd 1063, 1068; error held to be harmless.)

In a federal prosecution for re-entering the United States without permission after once having been removed, introduction of a “Certificate of Non-existence or Record” (or “CNR”), in which a District Director of the Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security certifies that “after a diligent search [of two agency databases,] no record was found to exist indicating that the defendant obtained consent . . . for readmission in the United States,” is a violation of the defendant’s right to confrontation. \textit{(United States v. Orozco-Acosta} (9th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3rd 1156, 1161-1162, and fn. 3.)

See also \textit{United States v. Valdovinos-Mendez} (9th Cir. 2011) 641 F.3rd 1031, 1034; finding that despite the Sixth Amendment violation of allowing the CNR into evidence, such evidence was harmless was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where sufficient other evidence existed to prove the same fact.

Admission of a written report of defendant’s blood alcohol level violated defendant’s right to confront the analyst who prepared the report. The report was clearly testimonial in nature as a statement made in order to prove a fact at defendant’s criminal trial, and the testimony of the substitute analyst who did not perform or observe the reported test did not satisfy the right to confrontation. Further, the report did not consist exclusively of a machine-generated number but also indicated that the analyst properly received defendant’s sample, performed testing on the sample adhering to a precise protocol, and observed no circumstance or condition affecting the integrity of the sample or the validity of the analysis. The substitute analyst could not convey what the reporting analyst knew or observed, or expose any lapses or inaccuracies on the
part of the reporting analyst.  (*Bullcoming v. New Mexico* (June 23, 2011) __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705; 180 L.Ed.2nd 610].)

A detective’s testimony that indisputably conveyed some of the critical substance of the witness’s statements to the jury was found to be in violation of the Confrontation Clause even though his testimony was not detailed. Altogether, the detective’s testimony indicated that the unavailable witness had confirmed the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime. The admission of testimony regarding the unavailable witness’s statements, in combination with the prosecutor’s closing remarks, had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. (*Ocampo v. Vail* (2011) 649 F.3rd 1098, 1107-1113.)

Examples of “Non-Testimonial” statements that may be admitted into evidence:


Statements are not testimonial when made to a friend of the declarant’s under circumstances where the declarant did not believe that they would later be used against him in court. (*People v. Cervantes* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 169-174.)

The interviews of a slashing victim conducted by a police officer, both in the hospital emergency room and later at the police station, are clearly testimonial, although the victim’s statements to the emergency room doctor, asked for the purpose of determining treatment that was to be given, is not testimonial. (*People v. Cage* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965; the issue being the admissibility of the victim’s hearsay statements under E.C. §§ 1240 [spontaneous statements] and 1370 [victim’s report of physical injury].)

A 9-1-1 call from the victim in a domestic violence incident, telling the 9-1-1 operator that her husband had just hit her, qualified both as a “spontaneous statement,” per

Also, the initial responding officer’s interview of the victim at the scene were held to be non-testimonial. “Preliminary questions asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred do not rise to the level of an ‘interrogation.’” (*Id.*, at p. 469.)


Similarly, a 9-1-1 call from the victim of a physical confrontation and stabbing, telling the 9-1-1 operator that defendant had just stabbed him in the stomach, qualified both as a “spontaneous statement,” per E.C. § 1240, for purposes of the hearsay rule, and a non-testimonial statement for purposes of *Crawford v. Washington*. (*People v. Brenn* (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 166.)

Also, the victim’s brief description of what happened (“(The victim) seemed befuddled and in agony, saying only that someone had stabbed him next door with a kitchen knife.”), responding to the brief questioning of the first officer on the scene, held to be non-testimonial under the circumstances. (*Ibid.*)

Although structured interviews of a domestic violence assault victim by a law enforcement officer, generally admissible under E.C. § 1370 (victim’s report of physical injury), are testimonial and therefore inadmissible when the victim later refuses to testify, the first initial statements obtained from the victim by responding police officers before they know what, if any, crime they may have had, are not testimonial and thus admissible under the prior *Ohio v. Roberts* standard. (*People v. Kilday* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 406; *People v. Banos* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 483, 493-496, 497.)

*Note:* *Kilday* has been granted review by the California Supreme Court and is therefore not citable authority.
An anonymous 9-1-1 call from a witness giving a suspect’s vehicle description and license number, as a “spontaneous statement” (E.C. § 1240), is admissible as non-testimonial. (People v. Caudillo (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1417.)

A laboratory report introduced at probation revocation hearing and reflecting the analysis of contraband (i.e., rock cocaine in this case), is not testimonial. (People v. Johnson (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1409.)

Testimony by a supervising criminalist who reviewed the report of another laboratory employee in a cocaine possession case, who did not testify, held to be non-testimonial. Also, the content of the report is not being offered as a substitute for live testimony and the defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the supervising criminalist. (People v. Salinas (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 958.)

The lab report is admissible under the “public records exception” (E.C. § 1280) to the hearsay rule. (People v. Parker (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 110.)

The words of a prospective purchaser of narcotics calling the defendant’s home in a phone call answered by police officers executing a search warrant, is admissible when testified to by the officer as non-testimonial hearsay (and admitted as a judicially created hearsay exception). (People v. Morgan et al. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 935. 947.)

Statements made to co-workers, admissible at trial as prior inconsistent statements (E.C. §§ 770, 1235), are not testimonial even though later included in police reports. (People v. Butler (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 49, 59.)

An officer’s filled-out proof of service, attesting to the details of the service of a domestic violence temporary restraining order, is not testimonial in nature, and is therefore admissible hearsay, to be used in evidence pursuant to P.C. § 1102 and CCP § 2009 to prove the fact that defendant was served with notice of the order. (People v. Saffold (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 979.)

Statements made by the defendant to another person (i.e., Sanchez) (admissible as a spontaneous statement; E.C. §
who was not law enforcement, introduced into evidence through the testimony of a police officer who interviewed Sanchez as to those statements, were admissible as a prior inconsistent statement (E.C. § 1235) when Sanchez, who testified, denied having made those statements to the officer. The defendant’s statements to Sanchez were non-testimonial. Sanchez relaying those statements to the officer were admissible despite Crawford because Sanchez testified and was subject to cross-examination. (People v. Rincon (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 738, 749-757.)

Documentary evidence (i.e., court or prison records) used to prove the existence of one or more prior convictions and/or imprisonments for purpose of enhancing a defendant’s present sentence, is non-testimonial. (People v. Taulton (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1218; the defendant’s “P.C. § 969b packet,” or prison records, in this case.)

Police officers' recorded statements on tape, recording during a high speed pursuit, even if testimonial (holding that they were probably not), did not violate Crawford. (People v. Mitchell (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1210.)

A co-conspirator’s statement to another co-conspirator (testified to by the second co-conspirator), is not testimonial, and therefore admissible. (United States v. Allen (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3rd 1231, 1234-1235.)

Spontaneous declarations (per E.C. § 1240) made to a non-law enforcement witness, implicating a co-defendant, held to be admissible against the non-confessing co-defendant over Sixth Amendment Aranda/Bruton and Crawford objections. (People v. Smith (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 914.)

A murder suspect’s confession to his attorney, implicating defendant as a co-principal in the murder, was non-testimonial in nature. Therefore, after the murder suspect was himself murdered and thus not available for defendant’s trial, his attorney’s testimony as to what the suspect had told him was not precluded by the Crawford v. Washington, supra, decision. (Jensen v. Pilier (9th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3rd 1086.)

Responses to an officer’s initial questions upon arriving at the scene of an incident, where they “need to know whom
they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their safety, and possible danger to the potential victim,” are not testimonial. The admissibility of the responses to these initial questions will not be precluded by Crawford. (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 822-827 [165 L.Ed.2nd 224].)

Statements of an elder adult to a social worker and a nurse, even though a law enforcement investigator accompanied them, where the “primary purpose” of the interview “was to assess (the victim’s) mental and physical condition and deal with her potentially critical need for assistance and protection.” (People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731, 743.)

Also held to be “non-testimonial” was a video-taped tour of the victim’s home. (Id., at p. 746.)

A domestic violence victim’s statement (“He punched me in the face, look at my nose”) held to be non-testimonial when obtained as a result of an officer’s question; “What happened.” The officer had come to the front door and heard a woman screaming. Defendant answered the door with blood on his hands. The victim had a bloody, broken nose. “(A)lthough (the officer) might have suspected domestic violence, (the officer) did not know at that point whether or not a crime had been committed. Having interrupted an “ongoing emergency” and attempting to obtain information from the victim in order to assess the situation, the victim’s response to the officer’s question was held not to be testimonial. (People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477-1480.)

The excited utterances of defendant’s victims who, up to the moment of the arrival of the police, were being held captive by the defendant, were admissible through the testimony of the first police officer on the scene who at that point was merely trying to find out what had happened, and what may happen in the next few minutes. (People v. Chaney (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 772.)

A victim of a domestic violence incident which had occurred some 30 minutes earlier, where her husband had battered her and threatened to kill her, even though she was at the police station reporting the incident, where the court held that the officer’s questions to her about what had happened were
asked for “the primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” *People v. Saracoglu* (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1591-1598; rejecting defendant’s argument [and the Attorney General’s concession] that the emergency was over.)

A police officer/gang expert’s hearsay testimony, testified to as a basis for his expert opinion that the predicate crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, per P.C. § 186.22. *People v. Thomas* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1210; *People v. Ramirez* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1422.)

Any statements “offered for purposes of probable cause,” i.e., is “offered as a basis for action, nor for its truth.” *United States v. Mitchell* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 931, 966.)

Surreptitiously recorded statements between two homicide suspects in a holding cell are not “testimonial” and may be used against both of them at trial. *People v. Jefferson* (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 830, 842-844.)

A DNA analysis report, from which a DNA expert testified, held to be admissible as non-testimonial without the live testimony of the examiner who prepared the report. *People v. Geier* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 593-607.)

However, casting doubt on the continuing validity of *People. V. Geier, supra, is Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts* (2009) 557 U.S. 305 [174 L.Ed.2nd 314; 129 S.Ct. 2527], decided on June 25, 2009, where it was held that a forensic report prepared by a laboratory technician is testimonial, and thus inadmissible under *Crawford* as a Sixth Amendment confrontation issue, requiring the technician himself to testify.

See *People v. Vargas* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 647, 659-660, noting the conflict, but declining to decide whether *Melendez-Diaz* did in fact overrule *Geier* in that even if error, the evidence was harmless.

A defendant’s rap sheets offered into evidence for the purpose of proving his prior convictions are not testimonial because they are not prepared for the primary purpose of a criminal prosecution. Also, they are not facts related to the charged crime, but rather historical data only. (*People v. Morris* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 363.)

An injured victim’s statements about how her neck had been cut and a description of the assailant, made initially to a paramedic and then to the first police officer on the scene, obtained by both individuals in response to an on-going emergency and for the primary purpose of determining what had happened, were non-testimonial and admissible in evidence at defendant’s trial when this victim died prior to trial. (*People v. Osorio* (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 163.)

Calling for police assistance from a phone booth, reporting her fear of defendant, did not constitute testimonial statements. (*People v. Banos* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 483, 497.)

A mortally wounded victim told police that defendant had shot him. The officers testified at trial about what the victim, who died shortly after the shooting, had told them. The United States Supreme Court held that the informality of the exchange suggested that the officers’ purpose was to address what they perceived to be an ongoing emergency. The circumstances lacked any formality that would have alerted the victim to, or focused him on, the possible future prosecutorial use of his statements. Under these circumstances, the victim’s identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were not testimonial hearsay. The *Sixth Amendment*, therefore, did not bar their admission at defendant's trial. (*Michigan v. Bryant* (2011) ___ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 1143; 179 L.Ed.2nd 93].)

A witness to a murder perceived the event within the meaning of *Evid. Code, § 1240(a)* (Spontaneous Statements) and was sufficiently affected for the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule to apply. The confrontation clause of the *Sixth Amendment* did not bar the witness’s statements (who was unavailable
due to dementia) made to the initial officer on the scene, even though taking place about an hour after the shooting, because they were not testimonial but addressed an emergency. (*People v. Blacksher* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 809-818.)

A “Warrant of Removal,” documenting the order that defendant be removed from the United States and his actual physical removal, is not made in contemplation of litigation and is therefore non-testimonial. (*United States v. Orozco-Acosta* (9th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3rd 1156, 1162-1164.)

A shooting victim’s statement to a firefighter while en route to the hospital in an ambulance, identifying the defendant as the person who shot him, was not testimonial even though made in response to the firefighter’s question. (*People v. Nelson* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1460-1468.)

A federal “Warning to Alien Ordered Removed or Deported,” like a “Warrant of Removal,” is non-testimonial because it is prepared routinely and is not made in anticipation of litigation. The Warning is a standardized form with no personalized content or factual findings. (*United States v. Valdovinos-Mendez* (9th Cir. 2011) 641 F.3rd 1031, 1034-1035.)

Documentary evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions is non-testimonial. Therefore, determining the truth of defendant’s prior convictions based on those documents did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The materials included in a prior-conviction packet under P.C. § 969b are not prepared for the purpose of providing evidence in criminal trials or for determining whether criminal charges should issue. The records were made for other purposes in the ordinary course of other business of the courts and agencies and were maintained for other purposes. They were offered as evidence only if an accused committed another offense. Accordingly, the records were beyond the scope of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and cross-examination. (*People v. Larson* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 832, 836-838.)

Examples of “Testimonial” statements that may be admitted into evidence because defendant was accorded his right to cross-examine the hearsay declarant:
“(W)hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 975, fn. 6, citing Crawford, supra, at p. 59, fn. 9.)

A wife’s statement to the police about defendant having beaten her, admissible as a “Threat of Infliction of Injury,” per E.C. § 1370, was held to be admissible at trial after the victim/wife refused to testify at trial but where the defendant had had the opportunity to cross-examine her at the preliminary hearing. (People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224.)

A four-year-old child’s statements to a Child Protective Services interviewer, although “testimonial” in nature and thus potentially in violation of Crawford, are admissible pursuant to E.C. § 1360 so long as the defendant did have the opportunity to cross-examine her. (People v. Warner (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 331; where the four-year-old was found competent to testify by the trial court and did in fact do so.)

The fact that the child/witness/victim was unable to remember much of what she had previously told the interviewer was held to be irrelevant. The Sixth Amendment confrontation protection only guarantees defendant an “opportunity” to cross-examine the witness; not a guarantee that such cross-examination will necessarily be effective. (Ibid.)

Note: Review was granted in Warner by the California Supreme Court (Sept. 15, 2004), making this case unavailable for citation pending decision by the High Court.

A defendant’s right to confrontation is not denied when the prosecution offers a witness a plea bargain in exchange for the witness’s truthful testimony, but does not allow for the execution of the plea agreement until after the completion of defendant’s case. When the prosecution decided not to use the witness’s testimony, and where the witness therefore refused to testify for the defense claiming the benefits of his Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
privilege, but the trial judge relaxed the hearsay rule thereby providing the defense a means to get the witness’s proposed evidence before the jury through the testimony of other witnesses, there was no Sixth Amendment confrontation violation.  (People v. Woods (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 929, 934-939.)

A child’s testimony, answering “I don’t know” to many of the questions, did not make her unavailable.  “The Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ (Citations.)” (Italics in original; People v. Harless (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 70, 85-88.)

Note:  Review was granted in Harless by the California Supreme Court (Mar. 23, 2004), making this case unavailable for citation pending decision by the High Court.

The same issue occurred in People v. Guess (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 148, where the witness had testified during the preliminary examination, but the defendant received discovery concerning that witness’s proposed testimony late and the magistrate denied defendant’s motion for a continuance.  Defendant complained that his ability to effectively cross-examine the witness at the prelim was compromised, depriving him of his right to confrontation when the preliminary hearing transcript was used at trial (per E.C. § 1291; former testimony) because the witness had disappeared by then.  The Court ruled that Crawford and the Sixth Amendment only guarantee the “opportunity” to cross-examine the witness.  (Review granted, June 27, 2007.  As such, this decision is not citable.)

Statements made to co-workers, admissible at trial as prior inconsistent statements (E.C. §§ 770, 1235), are not testimonial.  However, even if they were, the persons making such statements were available at trial for cross-examination.  Just because they denied making such statements does not mean that defendant was deprived of his right to cross-examine them on the statements.  (People v. Butler (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 49, 59.)
A detective’s testimony concerning a witness identifying the defendant in a photographic lineup, per E.C. § 1238 (Prior Identification), was admissible when the witness also testified and was subjected to defendant’s cross-examination.  (People v. Bayor (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 355, 364-368.)

Note:  Review was granted in Bayor by the California Supreme Court (Sep. 21, 2004), making this case unavailable for citation pending decision by the High Court.

A witness’s preliminary hearing testimony, where he was subject to the defendant’s cross-examination, after the witness, at trial, asserted a Fifth Amendment right not to testify (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 303.) or was unavailable because he died between the prelim and trial (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114 1171-1174.), or disappeared after the preliminary hearing and couldn’t be located by the prosecution executing “due diligence” to find her.  (People v. Byron (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 657, 674.)

Police officers’ recorded statements on tape, recording during a high speed pursuit, even if testimonial (holding that they were probably not), did not violate Crawford because the officers testified at trial and were subject to cross-examination.  (People v. Mitchell (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1210.)

Statements made by a bank robbery co-conspirator to an F.B.I. agent that were testified to by the agent, where the declarant also testified and was subject to cross examination. (United States v. Allen (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3rd 1231, 1234-1235.)

The results of a “conditional examination” of a witness, per P.C. §§ 1335 et seq., are admissible at trial because the defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, despite the fact that the facts known to defendant, which may have resulted in other questions being asked, changed after the examination, at least in the absence of any wrongful failure by the prosecution to provide timely discovery.  (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 115-116.)
A witness who feigns forgetfulness, saying he has no memory of the event, is nonetheless subject to cross-examination. The jury is still able to evaluate his demeanor and assess his credibility. His prior recorded statement to the police about the event in issue is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement (E.C. § 1235). (*People v. Gunder* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 412, 419-120.)

Statements by a domestic violence victim to police after defendant had already fled the scene, in one instance, and after he was already arrested in another instance, were testimonial, but nevertheless admissible under the “Rule of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing” based upon evidence that defendant later murdered the victim to keep her from reporting the incidents to the police and from testifying. (*People v. Banos* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 483, 497-498, 499-504)

Admission at trial of a witness’s preliminary hearing testimony where the witness, prior to trial, properly asserted his right against self-incrimination, was proper, despite the fact that at the preliminary hearing, the witness was given “use immunity” by the prosecution, and then later, after the prelim, was charged with murder (with his use immunity withdrawn) prior to trial. Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary examination. The prosecutor’s decision to later charge that witness as an accomplice in the murder, precipitating his unavailability to testify at trial, did not improperly deprive defendant of his right to cross-examine him at trial. Absent an improper motive, the prosecution was not required to again provide the witness with immunity at the trial. (*People v. Hollinquest* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1546-1553, as modified at 2011 Cal.App. LEXIS 36 (1/13/11).)

See also the “Rule of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing,” below.

**Testimonial Statements when offered for a Non-Hearsay Purpose:**

Admission of hearsay statements when admitted as the basis for an expert’s opinion, although maybe testimonial, do not involve the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. (*People v. Thomas* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1208-1210; gang expert’s testimony about conversations had with gang members on the street, offered as to support his opinion as to defendant’s gang membership.)
The rule of *Crawford* does not apply in a civil, Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”) commitment proceeding, and is not applicable to an expert’s testimony about hearsay statements that served as a basis for his or her opinion. (*People v. Fulcher* (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 41, 53-57.)

Police officers’ recorded statements on tape, recording during a high speed pursuit, even if testimonial (holding that they were probably not), did not violate *Crawford* because they were not offered to prove the truth of the statements. (*People v. Mitchell* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1210.)

Evidence of an elder adult’s mental state, even though in the form of an interview of the victim, is a non-hearsay purpose and thus does not invoke the rule of *Crawford*. (*People v. Cooper* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731, 744-745.)

Also, when an expert’s testimony is based partially upon the victim’s statements, using those statements for the non-hearsay purpose of reaching an opinion, those statements are admissible to show the basis for the expert’s opinions. (*Id.*, at p. 746-747.)

There are no confrontation clause restrictions on the introduction of an out-of-court statement when introduced into evidence for a non-hearsay purpose. (*People v. Cage* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 975, fn. 6.)

A slashing victim’s statement to an investigator at the hospital for days after she had been assaulted, that her assailant had tan skin, was admitted pursuant to E.C. § 1202, as a prior inconsistent statement and only for the purpose of impeaching her prior statement that her assailant had been white, was admissible. (*People v. Osorio* (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 603, 615-616.)

A gang member’s out-of-court testimonial statement to a police officer that defendant directed a gang-related robbery, as basis evidence to support the opinion of the prosecution’s gang expert that defendant was an active, high-ranking gang member when he committed the charged crimes, and not as substantive evidence that defendant was an active, high-ranking gang member, was properly admitted into evidence. The Appellate Court held that the admission did not violate defendant's *Sixth Amendment*
rights. Out-of-court testimonial statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause when they were admitted solely as basis evidence and not as substantive or independent evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. (People v. Archuleta (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 493, 508-513.)

Whether or not such evidence is admissible is tested under E.C. § 352, determining whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs its potential prejudicial effect. (Id., at pp. 513-519.)

Testimonial Statements when offered in a Hearing Related to other than a Criminal Prosecution:

Testimonial hearsay statements of a child sexual molest victim are admissible in a civil child dependency case even though they would not have been admissible in a criminal case. “In a criminal case the issue is the guilt of the defendant, whereas in a dependency case the subject is the well-being of the victim . . . “ (In re April C. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 599, 610-612.)

Crawford does not apply in a probation revocation proceeding in that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies only to “criminal prosecutions.” (United States v. Hall (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3rd 980; held not to apply in post-conviction proceedings for violations of conditions of release.)

A hearsay statement that qualifies as a “spontaneous statement,” admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule under E.C. § 1240, when used at a probation revocation hearing, automatically satisfies the probationer’s due process confrontation/cross-examination rights without the court having to find good cause for the witness’s absence or to perform a balancing test. (People v. Stanphill (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 61, 78-81.)

The “balancing test” referred to by the court, and which the court declined to decide whether it applies to statements admitted under other hearsay exceptions, involves an analysis of the importance of the hearsay evidence to the court’s ultimate finding when balanced with the nature of the facts to be proven by the hearsay evidence, as described
in *United States v. Comito* (9th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3rd 1166.

*Crawford* applies to trial testimony only. Therefore, so long as otherwise reliable, hearsay evidence was admissible at defendant’s sentencing. (*United States v. Littlesun* (9th Cir. 2006) 444 F.3rd 1196; wife’s statements to an investigator as to how much methamphetamine defendant was dealing relevant to sentencing under federal sentencing guidelines.)

The Confrontation Clause has been held not to apply to civil forfeiture proceedings. (*United States v. $40,955 in United States Currency* (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F.3rd 752, 758; citing *United States v. Zucker* (1896) 161 U.S. 475, 481 [40 L.Ed. 777].)

**Testimonial Statements Admitted Under Equitable Principles:**

*The “Doctrine of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing:”*

“(I)f a witness is absent by his own [the accused’s] wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts.” (*Reynolds v. United States* (1879) 98 U.S. 145, 158 [25 L.Ed. 244].)

See also *Davis v. Washington* (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 832-834 [165 L.Ed.2nd 224]; a domestic violence case, where the “rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing” was noted to be applicable any time a defendant does something to procure the absence of a witness.

Where it is shown that the defendant prevented a witness’s testimony, when the witness is “kept back,” “detained” by “means of procurement,” whenever the defendant’s acts are “designed to prevent the witness from testifying,” then he will not be able to prevent otherwise admissible (under a hearsay exception) statements of the witness (or victim) from being admitted into evidence. (*Giles*
v. California (2008) 554 U.S. 353 [171 L.Ed.2nd 488; 128 S.Ct. 2678]; reversing the California Supreme Court which had held that merely being the cause of the witness’s unavailability was sufficient, whether or not done to prevent his or her testimony in the instant case.)

The rule of Giles, to the effect that the forfeiture exception applies only if a defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying, as a new rule, is not to be applied retroactively. (Ponce v. Felker (9th Cir. 2010) 606 F.3rd 596.)

And see People v. Costello (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 973, where the Appellate Court approved the admission of six separate prior spontaneous statements of the victim, admissible pursuant to E.C. § 1109(a) (prior acts of domestic violence), through the testimony of responding police officers at defendant’s trial for murdering that same victim, under the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” theory, while providing a complete history of the theory from Reynolds, supra (in 1879), to Crawford.

Statements by a domestic violence victim to police after defendant had already fled the scene, in one instance, and after he was already arrested in another instance, were testimonial, but nevertheless admissible under the “Rule of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing,” based upon evidence that defendant later murdered the victim to keep her from reporting the incidents to the police and from testifying. (People v. Banos (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 483, 497-498, 499-504)

“Dying Declarations:” An example of a “testimonial” statement that may be admitted into evidence on “equitable principles.” or because of its recognition as a hearsay exception before the establishment of the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause.

Because the “dying declaration” exception to the hearsay rule is one that was recognized at common law, and in existence at the time of the establishment of the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation, admitting such hearsay is not a Sixth Amendment violation. (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 762-765; A robbery victim’s dying declaration properly admitted into evidence whether or not it was “testimonial.”)

A murder victim’s dying declaration, identifying defendant as the murderer, was admissible through the testimony of the officer (and a tape of the interview) who interviewed the witness to the dying declaration who, in recanting his statement to the officer, denied, at trial, that the victim had in fact identified defendant. (People v. Mayo (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535; Crawford not violated.)

The “Rule of Completeness;” per E.C. § 356:

Where defendant is allowed to use evidence of certain statements of a co-principal under the theory that they are being admitted for a non-hearsay purpose (e.g., to support defendant’s claim that he acted in fear for his life), the prosecution will be allowed to introduce other testimonial statements obtained in the same police interview where necessary to prevent the co-principal’s statements to police from being taken out of context, per E.C. § 356. (People v. Parrish (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 263, 269-276.)

Other Exceptions to the Rule of Crawford:

Testimonial statements made by a co-suspect in the defendant’s presence, where the co-suspect is later not available for cross-examination at trial, are still admissible under the theory that the statements become those of the defendant as “adoptive admissions” (E.C. § 1221) when the defendant fails to deny them at the time the declarations are originally made. (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 842-844: Admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of giving meaning to the defendant’s silence in face of the co-suspect’s incriminatory statements to the police.)

Adoptive admissions made by three robbery/murder suspects, all interviewed together, where the investigator sought the agreement of each as questions were asked and
answers provided by one of more of the defendants. *(People v. Castille (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 863, 876-883.)*

A probation revocation hearing is not a “criminal prosecution” to which the **Sixth Amendment** applies. Therefore a laboratory report introduced at the probation revocation hearing and reflecting the analysis of contraband (i.e., rock cocaine in this case), does not implicate a defendant’s right to confrontation under the **Sixth Amendment**. Rather, the issue is one of the defendant’s right to “due process” under the **Fourteenth Amendment**. *(People v. Johnson (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1409; report held to be admissible.)*

Failing to deny a sentencing judge’s comment that defendant “broke just about every bone in the victim’s body” was held by the California Supreme Court not to be an adoptive admission, per **E.C. § 1221**, reversing the lower court on this issue. As such, the use of the defendant’s silence to such an accusation may not be used to prove a prior conviction and a third strike when offered as proof of such conviction in a subsequent case. *(People v. Thoma (2007) 150 Cal.4th 1096.)*

Evidence admitted under **E.C. § 356** (i.e., the “**Rule of Completeness:**” “Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; . . . “) does not violate **Crawford**. The propose of **E.C. § 356** is founded “not on reliability but on fairness so that one party may not use selected aspects of a conversation . . . so as to create a misleading impression on the subject addressed.” *(People v. Parrish (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 263; co-suspect’s hearsay statements admitted into evidence to rebut other parts of the same interview by law enforcement that were introduced by defendant to support his argument that he participated in the crime under duress.)*

Hearsay statements of a co-defendant that have been redacted to eliminate any references to the defendant “serves to prevent **Crawford** error.” *(People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 199; citing United States v. Chen (2nd Cir. 2004) 393 F.3rd 139, 150.)*
“‘A witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a witness “against” a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant.’ (Citation) The only exception to this rule is the narrow class of statements . . . that powerfully incriminate the defendant on their face because they directly implicate the defendant by name or do so in a manner the jury could not reasonably be expected to ignore. (Citations) Accordingly, redacted codefendant statements that satisfy Bruton’s (Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2nd 476].) requirements are not admitted ‘against’ the defendant for Crawford purposes. (Citation)” (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 506.)

See Aranda/Bruton, below.

Statements of a domestic violence victim which were testimonial but admitted into evidence anyway may not require reversal where they were merely cumulative to other evidence that was properly admitted (e.g., the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony). (People v. Byron (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 657, 676.)

Retroactivity of the Crawford Rule:

The rule of Crawford is not retroactive, at least when attempting to apply it to a case that is otherwise final (i.e., the defendant’s direct appeals have been exhausted), and is thereafter tested in a “collateral” habeas corpus petition. (In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68; habeas corpus petition challenging the competency of defense counsel.

The rule under Crawford, being a new procedural rule, and not one considered to be a “watershed” rule (i.e., one that implicates “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding”), is not retroactive for purposes of either direct or collateral appellate review. (Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406 [167 L.Ed.2nd 1]; see also Woods v. Sinclair (9th Cir. 2011) 655 F.3rd 886, 899, fn. 7.)

Also, it has been held that a limiting instruction is insufficient to cure a Crawford violation. (People v. Song (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 973, 984.)

Also note, however, that a defendant must object to a Sixth Amendment violation at trial in order to preserve the issue on appeal. Merely complaining that he is not being allowed to cross-examine a missing
witness whose hearsay statements are being admitted, without specifying that the objection is based upon Six Amendment grounds, does not preserve the issue on appeal. (People v. Chaney (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 772.)

Admissibility of a Co-Defendant’s Hearsay Admissions or Confession Implicating Defendant:

Aranda/Bruton Rule:

Use of the hearsay admissions or confession of one defendant at trial, admissible against that defendant pursuant to E.C. § 1220 (Party Admission), as testified to by that defendant’s interrogator, which implicate a co-defendant, at least when there is no hearsay exception applicable to that co-defendant and the confessing defendant does not testify at trial and is therefore not subject to cross-examination by the co-defendant, has been held to be a violation of the co-defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine his accuser (i.e., the confessing defendant). (People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2nd 476].)

Note: The Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8 (Cal. Consti. Art. I, § 28(d)) abrogated Aranda to the extent it required relevant evidence to be excluded when federal constitutional law did not require exclusion. (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 465; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1045, fn. 6.)

The “Aranda/Bruton Rule” does not apply unless the two co-defendants are “jointly tried.” A defendant cannot complain under this theory when the declarant, whose hearsay statements he is challenging, is tried separately. Other admissibility rules (e.g., hearsay) must be considered instead. (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1027, 1045, fn. 6.)

Neither Bruton nor defendant’s confrontation rights are violated merely by admitting testimony to the effect that a co-principal made a statement to police resulting in that co-principal being taken into custody, without any reference to the content of that statement or other references to the defendant. (Mason v. Yarborough (9th Cir. 2006) 447 F.3rd 693.)
“Bruton (and Aranda) must be viewed ‘through the lens of Crawford and Davis;’ if the challenged statement is not testimonial, the confrontation clause has no application. (Citation omitted) Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.” (People v. Arceo et al. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 556, 571.)


The Aranda/Bruton Rule also does not apply when there is a hearsay exception applicable to the non-confessing co-defendant, so long as the exception survives a “confrontation analysis.” For instance:

A “declaration against interest,” made by one codefendant to a witness, under circumstances where the proponent of the evidence establishes that the declarant is not available to testify (e.g., another defendant invoking his right to remain silent), and the statement has “adequate indicia of reliability” sufficient to justify dispensing with the requirement of confrontation, may be admissible. (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 326-334.)

“The Court has applied this ‘indicia of reliability’ requirement principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’ . . . [¶] . . . Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (Ibid; citing Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [65 L.Ed.2nd 597, 608]; see also People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 174-177, using the rule of Greenberger to uphold the admission into evidence statements of a co-principal to others than law enforcement (and thus, not a “testimonial” statement, per Crawford v. Washington, supra.) over the hearsay and confrontation objections of the other co-principals.)
Also, a “spontaneous statement” per E.C. § 1220, implicating the defendant, made by a co-defendant to his girlfriend, were admissible against the non-confessing defendant. Aranda and Bruton were held not to apply because the “party admission” exception was not used as grounds for admissibility. Crawford v. Washington, supra, did not apply because the statements were not “testimonial.” (See above). As statements which “bore adequate indicia of reliability” because they fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” they were properly admitted into evidence despite the lack of opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the co-defendant on those statements. (People v. Smith (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 914.)

The admission of statements possessing sufficient indicia of reliability to fall within the hearsay exception for declarations against interest did not deny a defendant the right of confrontation. The witness statements in this case qualified as declarations against interest which were so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to their reliability. Also, another statement qualified as a statement in furtherance of a conspiracy. Accordingly, because the witness statements here were admissible under state law as exceptions to the hearsay rule, there was no error in the admission of that testimony. (People v. Arceo et al. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 556, 571-579.)

Where Aranda and Bruton do apply, the alternative solutions to this problem are to:

- Try the defendants in separate trials, using the confessing defendant’s statements only in his own trial.
- Try the defendants in the same trial, but with a separate jury for each defendant.
- Try the defendants in the same trial and use the confessing defendant’s statements in evidence but redact (i.e., remove) any references to the co-defendant.
- Try the defendants in the same trial but exclude the statements altogether.

Redacting the confessing defendant’s statements, taking out any references to the co-defendant, creates a dilemma for the prosecutor:

“(T)he Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.”  (Richardson v. Marsh, supra, at p. 211 [95 L.Ed.2nd at p. 188].)

A defendant, however, is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation if references to defendant’s name are merely replaced by a symbol or by a blank space in place of the defendant’s name.  (Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185, 192 [140 L.Ed.2nd 294, 300-301].)

Prior to the decision in Gray, this prohibition on the use of a co-defendant’s redacted statements was not clearly established law.  Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d)(1), clearly established federal law includes only the Supreme Court’s decisions issued before the relevant adjudication of the merits of a prisoner’s claim, regardless of when the prisoner’s conviction became final.  A direct appeal was thus the relevant adjudication of the merits.  (Greene v. Fisher (Nov. 8, 2011) __ U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 38; 181 L.Ed.2nd 336].)

Similarly a reference to “another guy” is insufficient to overcome the Sixth Amendment confrontation issue.  (People v. Schmaus (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 846, 854-856.)

Redacting the codefendants’ hearsay statements to “other” or “others,” where the jury could easily determine that they were referring to defendant, was insufficient to avoid Aranda/Bruton error.  (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 230-236; error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the amount of other evidence of defendant’s guilt.

Whether or not such editing is sufficient to overcome the right-to-confrontation issues depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.  “The editing will be deemed insufficient to avoid a confrontation violation if, despite the editing, reasonable jurors could not avoid drawing the inference that the defendant was the co-participant designated in the confession by symbol or neutral pronoun.”  (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455-456.)
Where the co-defendant’s hearsay statements are redacted to the point where it is unknown who else was involved in a series of kidnappings and murders, but it is apparent that someone else was involved, and there are two or more other co-defendants being tried in the same case, may pose an Aranda/Bruton issue, depending upon the circumstances. (*People v. Lewis* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 453-460; Court held that if error, it was harmless error.)

“Severance may be necessary when a defendant’s confession cannot be redacted to protect a codefendant’s rights without prejudicing the defendant. [Citation] A defendant is prejudiced in this context when the editing of his statement distorts his role or makes an exculpatory statement inculpatory.” (*Id.,* at p. 457.)

The use of a non-testifying co-defendant’s statement to an investigator that the victim “had to be checked” (i.e., assaulted) because he had “disrespected the Nortenos,” where it was alleged that the other co-defendants were all members of the Nortenos gang, violated the other defendants’ confrontation rights despite not being named individually. (*People v. Pena et al.* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1219.)

Admission of one defendant’s statement to police, saying “Well, if you don’t find the gun, then you are going to let us go, right?”, assumed to be Aranda/Bruton error when the only person who could have been the one to toss the gun was the non-confessing co-defendant. (*People v. Reyes* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 214; error held to be harmless given the weight of the rest of the evidence.)

Redaction of the defendant’s statements, eliminating any reference to the codefendant at trial, tended to render the defendant’s exculpatory account of a shooting implausible. As such, defendant was prejudiced and his convictions on the affected counts were reversed. (*People v. Stallworth* (2007) 164 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1091-1103.)

Another solution recently upheld by an appellate court is to question all suspects together while obtaining each defendant’s concurrence with each of the others’ accounts. The defendant’s statements (i.e., the one who talked to the police) are then admissible against him under the “party admission” exception to the hearsay rule (*E.C. § 1220*), with those same statements admissible against the co-defendants as an “adoptive admission.” (*E.C. § 1221*) Such “deeply rooted” exceptions to the hearsay rule, given their obvious trustworthiness, do not violate the Sixth Amendment. (*People v. Castille* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 863.)
But see People v. Jennings (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 459, where the co-suspect did not always agree with her co-conspirator’s incriminatory statements. On appeal, the Court held that a criminal suspect does not “adopt” the incriminatory admissions of a co-suspect when she challenges the truth of those admissions.

The interrogation technique upheld in Castille was used again in People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 660-666 (co-defendant to the defendant Jennings in 112 Cal.App.4th 459, supra.), and found to be lawful. Specifically, the California Supreme Court held that this interrogation technique avoids any confrontation issues discussed in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2nd 177]; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2nd 518, and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2nd 476].

The prior People v. Jennings, found at 112 Cal.App.4th 459, cited above, was this Jennings’ wife, and co-defendant, whose appeal, not involving the death penalty, was litigated separately.

There are other automatic exceptions to the Aranda/Bruton rule of exclusion:


At a preliminary examination. (People v. Miranda (2000) 23 Cal.4th 340.)

When the confessing codefendant testifies and is therefore available for cross-examination by the one implicated in the codefendant’s confession. (Nelson v. O’Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622 [29 L.Ed.2nd 222].)

Aranda is also inapplicable when the non-testifying co-defendant’s admissions were introduced into evidence not for the truth of the content of such statements, but rather for the non-hearsay purpose of proving defendant’s state of mind in admitting his own involvement and as relevant to the defendant’s credibility when he testified that his admission was motivated by a desire to “bring forth the truth.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1208-1209.)

While using the pronoun “he” or “she,” if the person is still readily identifiable as the defendant, won’t avoid an Aranda problem, it might be okay if the defendant is but one of a “large group” of possible co-suspects. (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 466.)

Where defendant is one of only two other possible co-suspects, he might still qualify as part of a “large group.” (People v. Jefferson
Redactions that Prejudice the Defendant:

It is also possible that by redacting a defendant’s statements by eliminating any references to the codefendants, the defendant himself is made to look even more culpable to his prejudice. This might be error if it does in fact prejudice the speaking defendant. “Ordinarily, . . . a trial court should review both the unredacted and the redacted statements to determine whether the redactions so distort the original statement as to result in prejudice to the defendant.” (*People v. Gamache* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 378-382.)